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Admin Per Se For The Practitioner
Charles A. Pacheco*
On July 1, 1990, the provisions of Senate Bill 1623 became
operative, enacting extensive changes in California's traffic safety
regulation.1 Because this new law authorized the California
Department of Motor Vehicles to administratively suspend or revoke
a person's privilege to operate a motor vehicle,2 many criminal
defense attorneys who routinely handled drunk driving cases were
suddenly dragged kicking and screaming into the unfamiliar realm of
administrative law. As a result, attorneys who represented clients
charged with driving under the influence of alcohol were forced to
venture into an area of jurisprudence not often visited by criminal
defense attorneys-civil procedure, administrative writs, and equitable
remedies.3 The purpose of this Article is to assist criminal defense
* Juris Doctor, Lincoln University School of Law, Sacramento, California, 1978; Private
Practitioner, Sacramento, California. Mr. Pacheco has conducted several hundred Admin Per Se
hearings since July 1, 1990, when the newly created Administrative Per Se law became effective, and
acted as both trial and appellate counsel in Helmandollar v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 7 Cal.
App. 4th 52,9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 155 (1992), discussed infra, at notes 166-171, and accompanying text.
The author is especially grateful to Michael J. Fannon and David P. Cusick for their assistance
in the research, suggestions, advice, and editorial organization of this article.
1. See generaUy 1989 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1460, at 5548 (West) (amending CAL. VEl. CODE
§§ 13353, 13551, 14100, 14601.2,23157; amending and renumbering CA. VEt. CODE § 13353.1;
enacting CAL. VEi. CODE §§ 13353.2, 13353.3, 13353.4, 13353.6, 13353.7, 13557, 13558, 13559,
14905, 23158.2, 23158.5).
2. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 13353.2(a) (West Supp. 1992) (authorizing the Department of
Motor Vehicles to administratively suspend a driver's license under specified conditions).
3. This Article has been written with the criminal defense practitioner in mind. Because the
author has assumed a basic understanding of the fundamentals of criminal defense, and, necessarily,
the ability to meet the California Bar Examinations requirements on the thirteen required California
subjects such as Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, and Criminal Procedure, this Article will not go
into an extensive review of these subjects. See generally 7 & 8 BERNARD E. Wm'N, SUMMARY OF
CAtu.mORN LAw, (9th ed. 1988) (discussing both state and federal constitutional law from the
practitioner's viewpoint); BERNARD B. WmruN & NORMAN L EPsTEI, CAwIFoRNIA CRIMINAL LAw
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practitioners who are unfamiliar with the administrative procedures
utilized in the process of defending an administrative license
suspension.
In Part I, this Article will discuss the background of the adminis-
trative suspension process.4 Part II will examine the administrative
proceedings, including the relevant rules of evidence, the require-
ments to sustain a suspension, and the requirements for license
reinstatement.5 Part II will explain how to obtain review of an
adverse decision by the Department of Motor Vehicles.6 Part IV
looks at cases which have attacked the new procedure as violative of
federal and state constitutional rights.
7
I. BACKGROUND
Prior to 1990, a person's privilege to drive an automobile could
be suspended or revoked in an alcohol related incident only under
three circumstances: (1) If the driver was convicted of driving while
under the influence of an alcoholic beverage, any drug, or both;8 (2)
driving with an excessive blood-alcohol concentration or driving
while addicted to narcotics;9 or (3) if the driver refused to submit to
a blood, breath, or urine chemical test after an arrest for these
offenses.1" If the driver had suffered a prior conviction for the same
offense within the previous seven years, the suspension or revocation
was enhanced." The actual suspension or revocation itself was
generally carried out by the Department of Motor Vehicles.12
(2d ed. 1989) (discussing both state and federal criminal law and criminal procedure from the
practitioner's viewpoint).
4. See infra notes 8-23 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 224-102 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 103-205 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 184-205 and accompanying text.
8. CAL. VEH. CODE § 13352 (West Supp. 1992); see id. § 23152 (West Supp. 1992) (stating
that it is illegal to drive with a Blood-alcohol level of more than .08%).
9. Id § 13352 (West Supp. 1992).
10. Id § 13353(a) (West Supp. 1992).
11. 1& § 13352 (West Supp. 1992).
12. In the case of a conviction for California Vehicle Code §§ 23152 or 23153, the
Department of Motor Vehicles would normally receive a duly certified abstract ofjudgment from the
trial court. CAL. VmL CODE § 13352 (West Supp. 1992). In the case of a driver who refused to
submit to chemical testing, the Department of Motor Vehicles required only the arresting officer's
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On October 2, 1989, then California Governor George
Deukmejian signed into law one of California's newest weapons in
the war on drunk drivers-automatic license suspension for driving
with an excessive blood alcohol level."1 This area has become
known as the "Administrative Per Se" law.4
Under the new law, the above statutory scheme remained
essentially the same. However, added to the arsenal of weapons
designed to combat drunk drivers was California Vehicle Code
section 13353.2. Under this section, the Department of Motor
Vehicles is required to "immediately" suspend the driving privilege
of anyone who is found to have operated a vehicle with a blood-
alcohol level exceeding a specific limit."5
sworn statement that the officer had reasonable cause to believe the person was driving while under
the influence of alcohol or drugs and refused to submit to a chemical test. I § 13353 (West Supp.
1992).
13. 1989 Cal. Legis. Sere. ch. 1460, sec. 7, at 5554 (West) (enacting CAL VEK. CODE §
13353.2). Although new in California, the automatic license suspension procedure was not new to
the United States. At the time California enacted California Vehicle Code § 13353.2, at least 23 other
states had enacted similar legislation. See generally UNITED STATES DEP'T OF TRANsP., NAT'L
HIGHWAY TRAmc SAFEtY ADMIN. QUESIONS MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED ABOUT ADMINISTRATIVE
LICENSE REVOCATION (1989).
14. See Peretto v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 235 Cal. App. 3d 449,452, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d
392, 393 (1991) (recognizing the administrative license suspension or revocation procedure as being
commonly called "administrative per se").
15. CAL. VEH. CODE § 13353.2(a) (West Supp. 1992). When first enacted, California Vehicle
Code § 13353.2, subdivision (a), provided for immediate suspension of a person's driving privilege
for operating or being in physical control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level of 0.10
percent or more. Id. However, in 1990, the California Legislature lowered the required blood alcohol
level to 0.08 percent or more to conform with the recent lowering of the blood alcohol level required
for a criminal conviction of California Vehicle Code § 23152, subdivision (b). 1990 Cal. Legis. Sere.
ch. 431, see. 4, at 1536 (West) (amending CAL. VEH. CODE § 13353.2); see Review of Selected 1990
California Legislation, 22 PAC. LJ. 321, 753 (1991) (explaining the effect of Chapter 431).
Although the admin per se procedures appear to fit in well with existing statutes, at least one
case has challenged the statutory scheme on the basis that it is in conflict with existing law. In
Robertson v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 7 Cal. App. 4th 938, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 319 (1992), the
First District Court of Appeal was asked to determine whether there was a conflict between the admin
per se statutes requiring automatic suspension and the second offender probation statutes providing
for a restricted license. Id at 940, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 320. Robertson was arrested and pleaded guilty
to driving under the influence of alcohol. Id. at 942-43, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 322. The sentencing court
placed Robertson on probation and restricted his driver's license for eighteen months, restricting
travel to and from work, to and from jail, and to and from a drunk driver program. Id. After
Robertson was sentenced by the municipal court, the Department of Motor Vehicles conducted an
admin per se hearing to determine whether Robertson's driving privileges should be suspended. Id.
Robertson opposed his license suspension based on a conflict between the admin per se statutes and
the second offender restricted driver's license provisions of the California Vehicle Code. Id. The
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The immediate suspension process under California Vehicle Code
section 13353.2 works as follows: A law enforcement officer arrests
a person for driving under the influence of alcohol. After submitting
to a chemical test, if the officer believes the person was driving or in
physical control of a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol level in
excess of the legal limit, the officer takes physical custody of the
person's driver's license.16 The officer must notify the driver that
his or her driving privilege will be automatically suspended in forty-
five days. 7 The driver is then issued a written notification which
operates as a temporary driver's license until the end of the forty-five
day period. 18
The notification given to the driver must include the reason and
statutory ground for the suspension, the right to request an adminis-
trative hearing, and the date when a request must be made to receive
a determination prior to the effective date of the suspension.9 If no
hearing is requested, the suspension becomes effective upon the date
Department of Motor Vehicles subsequently suspended Robertson's license. Id. at 943-44, 2 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 322. Robertson filed for a writ of mandate in the superior court, which issued the writ
because of the apparent conflict. Id. at 944, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 322. The Department of Motor
Vehicles appealed. Id. In finding that the two statutory schemes did not conflict, the First District
Court of Appeal explicitly recognized that the Legislature contemplated two separate processes in the
civil and criminal prosecution of people who drive under the influence of alcohol. Id. at 947, 2 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 325. Reasoning that the Legislature contemplated two processes-the criminal court
proceeding, and the administrative civil proceeding-the court of appeal held that it is possible for
a person to suffer dual periods of suspension, revocation or restriction. Id. at 947, 2 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
Therefore, although it is possible for a criminal court to grant a restricted license as a term of
probation in an alcohol related driving offense, this action does not preclude the Department of Motor
Vehicles from acting independently under the admin per s statutes to suspend or revoke a driver's
privilege to operate a motor vehicle.
16. CAL. VER. CODE § 23158.5(b) (West Supp. 1992).
17. Id § 13353.2(b) (West Supp. 1992).
18. Id § 23158.5(b) (West Supp. 1992).
19. Id § 13353.2(b), (c) (West Supp. 1992) (the arresting officer must give written notice of
the order of suspension to the driver pursuant to California Vehicle Code § 23158.5, or the
Department of Motor Vehicles must give written notice of the order of suspension by mail to the last
known address of the driver upon receipt of the report of the arresting officer); id. § 13353.3(a) (West
Supp. 1992) (providing that the effective date of an administrative suspension pursuant to California
Vehicle Code § 13353.2 shall be forty-five days after the driver is served with the written notice);
id. § 23158.5(a) (West Supp. 1992) (authorizing a peace officer to act on behalf of the Department
of Motor Vehicles to serve a written notice of the administrative suspension on a person who has
been arrested for a violation of California Vehicle Code §§ 23152 or 23153 with a blood-alcohol
level exceeding the legal limit).
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specified in the written notice."0 If the driver makes a timely
request, the Department of Motor Vehicles must hold a hearing
before the effective date of the order of suspension. 2' The only
issues to be decided at the hearing are: (1) Whether the officer had
reasonable cause to believe the driver was driving a vehicle in
violation of Vehicle Code section 23152 or 23153; (2) whether the
driver was lawfully placed under arrest; and (3) whether the driver
was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle with a
blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more.' The Department of
Motor Vehicles' determination of these issues is subject to a petition
for judicial review.23
II. ADMIN PER SE PROCEEDINGS
As stated above, because of the newly enacted administrative per
se laws, many criminal defense attorneys who routinely handled
drunk driving cases were suddenly faced with the unfamiliar realm
of administrative law. As a result, attorneys who represented clients
charged with driving under the influence of alcohol were forced to
venture into an area of jurisprudence not often visited by criminal
defense attorneys. Although a comprehensive and in depth review of
administrative law is beyond the scope and purpose of this Article,
this section is intended to briefly expose the criminal lawyer to
administrative law by providing a broad overview of administrative
proceedings, including the relevant rules of evidence, the require-
ments to sustain a suspension, and the requirements for license
reinstatement.
20. l1& § 13353.3(a) (West Supp. 1992). However, prior to the effective suspension date, the
Department of Motor Vehicles must make a factual determination of whether the driver was operating
or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more.
Id. §§ 13353.2(d), 13557(a) (West Supp. 1992).
21. IM § 13558(d) (West Supp. 1992).
22. At §§ 13558(a), (c)(2), 14100-14112 (West 1987 & Supp. 1992).
23. IX § 13559 (West Supp. 1992).
465
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A. General Overview of Evidentiary Rules
As a preliminary matter, it must be pointed out that administrative
hearings are civil in nature and therefore require a determination
based on a preponderance of the evidence standard.24 Furthermore,
although the consequences of an administrative hearing may be
punitive in nature, they are not criminal proceedings.' In fact, the
California Evidence Code does not even apply to administrative pro-
ceedings unless there is a statute making it applicable.26 As a result,
such proceedings need not be carried out in accordance with the rules
of evidence employed in criminal proceedings.27 Instead, adminis-
trative hearings are carried out according to administrative rules
which cannot be characterized as entirely civil nor entirely criminal.
The rules to be followed in an administrative hearing are governed
primarily by the California Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
which has liberalized the evidentiary rules in administrative
proceedings as compared to those used in criminal proceedings."
24. Peretto v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 235 Cal. App. 3d 449,462, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 392,
400 (1991).
25. Ford Dealers Assn v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 32 Cal. 3d 347,366 n.12, 650 P.2d
328, 339 n.12, 185 Cal. Rplr. 453, 464 n.12 (1982) (finding that when an administrative regulation
is challenged, the standard of constitutional vagueness is less strict than when a criminal law is
attacked; due process mandates do not necessarily require that the rules of procedure employed in
criminal courts be applied in license revocation proceedings); Webster v. Board of Dental Examiners,
17 Cal. 2d 534, 538, 110 P.2d 992, 995 (1941) (holding that the overwhelming weight of authority
has rejected any analogy which would require [an administrative] board to conduct its proceedings
in accordance with theories developed in the field of criminal law).
26. CAL EvID. CODE § 300 CmL (West 1966) (Law Revision Commission) (stating that "the
provisions of the [Evidence] Code do not apply in administrative proceedings, legislative hearings,
or any other proceedings unless some statute so provides or the agency concerned chooses to apply
them").
27. See Gilbert v. Superior Court, 193 Cal. App. 3d 161, 173,238 Cal. Rptr. 220,227 (1987)
(stating that a number of California cases relating to license revocation proceedings have rejected the
notion that a state regulatory board must conduct proceedings in accordance with theories developed
in the criminal law and specifically pointed out that due process requirements in criminal cases differ
from those applicable in administrative proceedings); Gore v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance,
110 Cal. App. 3d 184,198,167 Cal. Rptr. 881, 889 (1980) (stating that the principles of criminal law
protecting uninhibited appeal do not apply to civil cases arising out of administrative proceedings).
28. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11340-11528 (West 1992) (establishing the California
Administrative Procedure Act); see also CAL. Vmt. CODE § 14112 (West Supp. 1992) (providing that
all matters in a Department of Motor Vehicles license hearing not covered by the Vehicle Code are
to be governed by the California Administrative Procedure Act).
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This section of the Article will not only discuss the liberal nature of
the evidentiary rules in administrative hearings, but will also discuss
several other differences and similarities between the rules used in
administrative and criminal proceedings. These other areas of dis-
cussion include: (1) The use of objections, (2) the use of privileges,
(3) the exclusionary rule, and (4) the use of presumptions.
1. Liberal Nature of the Rules
The first noteworthy difference between administrative and
criminal evidentiary rules is that the rules used in administrative
hearings are more liberal. The APA specifically states that an
administrative hearing "need not be conducted according to the
technical rules relating to evidence and witnesses."29 As a result,
any relevant evidence will be admitted at an administrative hearing
"if it is the sort of evidence on which responsible persons are
accustomed to rely in the conduct of serious affairs, regardless of the
existence of any common law or statutory rule which might make
improper the admission of the evidence over objection in civil
actions. "3° However, any evidence that is irrelevant or unduly repe-
titious will be excluded if properly objected to by counsel.31
The rule regarding the admissibility of hearsay evidence in
administrative hearings has also been relaxed as compared to the rule
in criminal proceedings. The California APA specifically provides
that hearsay evidence may be used for the purpose of supplementing
or explaining other evidence but cannot be sufficient in itself to
29. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 11513(c) (West 1992); cf. Greenblatt v. Munro, 161 Cal. App. 2d
596, 605, 326 P.2d 929, 935 (1958) (holding that a party in an administrative hearing cannot make
a skeletal presentation with the expectation of making a more complete showing before a court).
30. CAL GOV'T CODE § 11513(c) (West 1992); cf. CAL EviD. CODE § 210 (West 1966)
(defining relevant evidence as evidence "having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove a
disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.").
31. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11513(c) (West 1992); see infra notes 36-54 and accompanying text
(discussing objections in administrative hearings).
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support a finding unless it would be admissible over objection in civil
actions.
32
Finally, even though there are several differences between the
evidentiary rules used in administrative and criminal proceedings,
there are also similarities. For example, the rules regarding privileges
in administrative hearings are similar to those used in criminal
proceedings. In fact, the APA specifically states that the rules of
privilege, as provided for in the Evidence Code, are applicable in
administrative hearings.
33
Although the administrative rules as stated above are liberal in
nature, the APA specifically includes various due process protections
in an attempt to ensure that the parties to an administrative hearing
receive a fair hearing. These protections include: (1) Testimony on
oath or affirmation; (2) the right to call and examine witnesses; (3)
the right to introduce exhibits; (4) the right to cross-examine
opposing witnesses on any relevant matter; (5) the right to impeach
any witness; and (6) the right to rebut evidence. 34 It is also
interesting to note that even if the respondent does not testify on her
own behalf, she may be called and cross-examined as if under cross-
examination.3"
2. Objections at Administrative Hearings
As stated above, the APA specifically provides that irrelevant and
unduly repetitious evidence are to be excluded from administrative
32. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11513(c) (West 1992); see Carlton v. Department of Motor Vehicles,
203 Cal. App. 3d 1428, 1432,250 Cal. Rptr. 809,810 (1988) (finding that a police officer's opinion
in his report that the licensee was "most responsible" for the accident is a legal conclusion and not
a proper subject for an expert opinion, thus it would not be admissible over objection at a civil trial);
Daniels v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 33 Cal. 3d 532, 538, 658 P.2d 1313, 1317-18, 189 Cal.
Rptr. 512, 516 (1983) (holding that the legislative mandate in § 11513 against sole reliance on
hearsay is not superseded by § 14108 of the Vehicle Code allowing the DMV to consider its own
official records if such records would not be admissible over objection at a civil trial).
33. CA . GOV'T CODE § 11513(c) (West 1992); see infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text
(discussing the use of privileges in administrative hearings).
34. CAL. GOV'T CODE 115 13(a)-(b) (West 1992); see Desert Turf Club v. Board of
Supervisors, 141 Cal. App. 2d 446,455, 296 P.2d 882, 887 (1956) (holding that common sense and
fair play dictate certain basic requirements for the conduct of any hearing at which facts will be
determined).
35. CALi GOV'T CODE § 11513(b) (West 1992).
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hearings and are therefore a proper basis for an objection. 6 In
addition, there are many other standard objections in court
proceedings which are also applicable at administrative hearings.
These include: (1) The form of a question (i.e. leading and/or
narrative); (2) cumulative evidence; (3) lack of foundation and/or
authentication; and (4) the best evidence rule. 7 Objections in an
administrative hearing should be made in essentially the same
manner and according to the same form and procedure in which they
are made in a typical court proceeding: Make the objection promptly;
object before a witness has a chance to answer, if possible, or move
to strike an unresponsive answer; make a continuing objection if
necessary; ask for a ruling if the administrative law judge (AU) 3"
does not give one; and make an offer of proof if there is a question
about the correctness of the AL's ruling.39 Although offers of proof
should also be made in the same manner as in court proceedings,
40
it is important to remember that offers of proof in the administrative
setting are especially important since the records of administrative
hearings are frequently reviewed by administrative bodies with final
decision making authority, and by the courts.
41
Finally, the same rule concerning the effect of afailure to object
in a court proceeding also applies in an administrative hearing.42 In
36. Id. § 11513(c) (West 1992).
37. See generally THoMAS A. MAUEr, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES, 331-63 (2d.
ed. 1988) (providing a thorough discussion about objections at the trial level); see also CAL. EvID.
CODE § 1500 (West Supp. 1992) (providing for the best evidence rule).
38. It should be noted that there are no Administrative Law Judges at Department of Motor
Vehicle hearings. Such hearings are administered by an employee of the Department of Motor
Vehicles who acts as a referee. CAL. VEH. CODE § 14104.2 (West Supp. 1992). However, the same
rules governing Administrative Law Judges are also applicable to the Department's referees.
39. See generally MAUET, supra note 37, at 331-63 (providing a thorough discussion about
objections at the trial level).
40. The offer of proof should consist of the substance, purpose, and relevance of the excluded
evidence. See CAL. Evm. CODE § 354(a) (West 1966) (providing for offer of proof requirements).
41. To make an offer of proof in an administrative hearing, counsel need only ask ALJ for
permission to do so. Normally, the ALT will simply grant counsel permission, but she may have the
attorney make the offer only after any board or panel members are dismissed. See CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 11517(a) (West 1992) (providing that members of an agency may hear a case together with the
AIU).
42. CAL. EviD. CODE § 353 (West 1966) (providing that a verdict or judgment will not be
reversed based on an erroneous admission of evidence when no objection or motion to exclude was
made); see Savelli v. Board of Medical Examiners, 229 Cal. App. 2d 124, 139, 40 Cal. Rptr. 171,
469
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other words, such a failure to object will constitute a waiver. This
rule applies even if the party failing to object is not represented by
counsel.43
Although there are many similarities between the types of
objections applicable in both administrative hearings and court
proceedings, there are also several differences of which an attorney
should be aware. The most noteworthy difference, for purposes of
this Article, deals with the concept of hearsay. Hearsay evidence is
evidence of a statement that was made other than by a witness while
testifying at the hearing which is offered to prove the truth of the
matter stated." In court proceedings, hearsay evidence is generally
inadmissible unless it falls within a specific exception.45
On the other hand, hearsay which would be inadmissible in a
court proceeding is often found to be admissible in administrative
hearings. The APA specifically provides in Government Code section
11513, subdivision (c), that "[hiearsay evidence may be used for the
purpose of supplementing or explaining other evidence but shall not
be sufficient in itself to support a finding unless it would be admis-
sible over objection in civil actions." ' In interpreting this provision,
several cases have held that the hearsay statement of a public
employee, such as the statement of a police officer, or the test
administrator's written report of the results of a blood-alcohol test, is
181 (1964) (finding that hearsay evidence was of probative value because it was not objected to when
it was offered) cert denied 380 U.S. 934 (1965); Tennant v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 77 Cal. App. 2d
489, 498, 175 P.2d 568, 573 (1946) (holding that respondent could not later object to the fact that
a report was not introduced since he failed to object at the hearing).
43. August v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 264 Cal. App. 2d 52,64,70 Cal. Rptr. 172, 180
(1968).
44. CAL. EviD. CODE § 1200(a) (West 1966). Hearsay can also consist of oral or written
verbal eipression, or nonverbal conduct intended as a substitute for oral or written verbal expression.
Id.
45. See id. § 1200(b) (West 1966) (stating that except as otherwise provided by law, hearsay
is inadmissible).
46. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11513(c) (West 1992) (emphasis added); see Carlton v. Department
of Motor Vehicles, 203 Cal. App. 3d 1428, 1432, 250 Cal. Rptr. 809, 810 (1988) (holding that a
police officer's opinion in an accident report was hearsay and insufficient to support a license
revocation because the report would not be admissible under the business records or official records
exceptions to the hearsay rule); Szmaciarz v. State Personnel Bd., 79 Cal. App. 3d 904,913-14, 145
Cal. Rptr. 396, 400-01 (1978) (finding that hearsay testimony of witnesses regarding respondent's
marijuana use was admissible since it would be admissible in a civil action over objection as an
admission by a party).
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admissible at a Department of Motor Vehicles hearing and is suffi-
cient in and of itself to support a finding of fact, if it meets the
criteria of the public employee business record exception to the
hearsay rule.47 This otherwise objectionable hearsay, which is
admissible in administrative hearings, is referred to as "adminis-
trative hearsay. "
48
Although the above statutory language of Government Code
section 11513, subdivision (c), regarding the admissibility of
administrative hearsay does not specifically require that there be an
objection to the hearsay, there is a split of authority among the
various districts of the California Court of Appeal as to whether
administrative hearsay that has not been objected to can be used in
itself to support a finding of fact.49 The question is whether section
11513, subdivision (c), implies the necessity for an objection.
The First District has repeatedly held that hearsay that is not
objected to is sufficient to support a finding in the absence of
contrary evidence.50 In other words, the First District has held that
an objection is necessary to preclude the use of hearsay alone to
support a finding of fact. The Second, Third and Fourth District
Courts of Appeal, however, have read section 11513, subdivision (c),
more literally. These districts have found that the legislative mandate
47. Burge v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 5 Cal. App. 4th 384, 388,7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5,7-8
(1992) (holding that the hearsay statement of a police officer satisfied the requirements of
Government Code § 11513 and was admissible at the Department of Motor Vehicles' hearing since
it met the public employee business record exception and was therefore admissible over objection
at a civil trial); Imachi v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 2 Cal. App. 4th 809, 815, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d
478,480-81 (1992); see CAL. EVID. CODE § 1280 (West 1966) (providing for public employee record
exception to the hearsay rule).
48. Los Robles Motor Lodge, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 246 Cal.
App. 2d 198, 205, 54 Cal. Rptr. 547, 551 (1966).
49. See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text (discussing the split of authority among the
various district courts).
50. See Borror v. Department of Investment, 15 Cal. App. 3d 531,546-47,92 Cal. Rptr. 525,
534 (1971) (holding that hearsay evidence that has not been objected to serves to shift the burden
of producing evidence of the existence or non-existence of the fact disclosed to the party failing to
object); Kirby v. Alcoholic Beverage Appeals Bd., 8 Cal. App. 3d 1009, 1019-20,87 Cal. Rptr. 908,
915-16 (1970) (finding that hearsay admitted without objection will have probative value unless there
is some admissible evidence to the contrary); Savelli v. Board of Medical Examiners, 229 Cal. App.
2d 124, 139, 40 Cal. Rptr. 171, 181 (1964) cert. denied 380 U.S. 934 (1965) (allowing the
introduction of objectionable hearsay admitted without objection to be considered in support of a
finding of fact).
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in subdivision (c) is controlling and does not require an objection to
preclude the use of administrative hearsay alone to support a finding
of fact.51
As stated above, although the literal language of section 11513,
subdivision (c) does not appear to require the making of an objection
to preclude the use of administrative hearsay alone to support a
finding of fact, counsel should always make such an objection in light
of the fact that there is such a split of authority. Finally, even though
otherwise inadmissable hearsay is often admissible in administrative
hearings, it is important to remember that it may be inadmissable for
other reasons. First, a proper foundation may not have been laid for
the introduction of the hearsay.52 Second, the hearsay evidence may
not meet the relevance standard used in administrative hearings, i.e.
it is not "the sort of evidence on which responsible persons are
accustomed to rely in the conduct of serious affairs."5 3 This would
be so, for example, if the hearsay were double or triple hearsay or if
any of the other dangers of hearsay were present making the hearsay
unreliable.5 4
3. Privileges
The California APA specifically provides that "the rules of
privilege shall be effective to the extent that they are otherwise
51. See San Dieguito Union High Sch. Dist. v. Commission on Professional Competence, 174
Cal. App. 3d 1176, 1189, 220 Cal. Rptr. 351, 358 (1985) (stating that the lack of an objection does
not convert incompetent evidence into substantial evidence to support a finding); Carl. S. v.
Commission for Teacher Preparation & licensing, 126 Cal. App. 3d 365,371-72,178 Cal. Rptr. 753,
757 (1981) (providing that if evidence has insufficient probative value to sustain the proposition for
which it is offered, the want of an objection adds nothing to its worth and it will not support a
finding); Martin v. State Personnel Bd., 26 Cal. App. 3d 573, 582-83, 103 Cal. Rptr. 306, 312 (1972)
(stating that, contrary to Borror, Kirby, and Savelli, the absence of objection to hearsay will not
support a finding of fact).
52. See White v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance, 128 Cal. App. 3d 699, 705-06, 180
Cal. Rptr. 516,520 (1982) (refusing to admit a document containing several hundred pages when lack
of foundation required the court to speculate on its relevancy and reliability).
53. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11513(c) (West 1992) (defining the administrative relevance
standard).
54. See EDwARD J. IMwitKzaImm r AL., CALIFORNIA EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONs, 237-39
(1988) (discussing the rationale underlying the hearsay rule).
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required by statute to be recognized at the [administrative]
hearing."' Thus, the evidentiary rules relating to privileges, as set
forth in the Evidence Code, are applicable in administrative hearings.
Such privileges include all of those privileges that could ordinarily be
invoked in a civil court case.5" In the absence of a specific statute,
privileges are not recognized.' However, when the existence of a
privilege has been established, no adverse inference can be drawn
after it is raised.58 In addition, the attorney's work product doctrine
is also available at administrative hearings to protect work product
from administrative discovery and administrative subpoenas.59
4. Exclusionary Rule
The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution guarantees that indi-
viduals will not be subjected to unreasonable searches and sei-
zures.6° Thus, in Mapp v. Ohio,61 the Supreme Court held that
55. CAL GOV'T CODE § 11513(c) (West 1992).
56. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 940 (West 1966) (providing for the privilege against self-
incrimination). A party in an administrative hearing is not afforded the privilege granted to defendants
in criminal proceedings allowing the defendant to refuse to testify as a witness. Comb v. Superior
Court, 68 Cal. App. 3d 89, 98, 137 Cal. Rptr. 233, 238 (1977); In re Vaughan, 189 Cal. 491, 495,
209 P. 353, 355 (1922). However, if called as a witness, a party in an administrative hearing may
invoke the privilege against self-incrimination. Borror v. Department of Inv., 15 Cal. App. 3d 531,
542,92 Cal. Rptr. 525,531 (1971). In California APA hearings, a party who does not testify in her
own behalfmay be called and examined as if under cross-examination. CAL GOV'T CODE § 11513(b)
(West 1992); see also CAL. EviD. CODE §§ 950-962 (West 1966 & Supp. 1992) (providing for the
attorney-client privilege); id. §§ 970-980 (West 1966 & Supp. 1992) (providing for the husband-wife
privilege); id. §§ 990-1007 (West 1966 & Supp. 1992) (providing for the physician-patient privilege);
id. 99 1010-1027 (West 1:66 & Supp. 1992) (providing for the psychotherapist-patient privilege);
id. 99 1030-1034 (West 1966) (providing for the clergyman-penitent privilege); id. §§ 1035-1036.2
(West 1966 & Supp. 1992) (providing for the sexual assault victim-counselor privilege); id. §§ 1060-
1061 (West 1966 & Supp. 1992) (providing trade secrets privilege); id. § 1070 (West Supp. 1992)
(providing for the news source privilege).
57. Id. § 911 (West 1966); see Chronicle Pub. Co. v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. App. 2d 548,
565, 354 P.2d 637, 645,7 Cal. Rptr. 109, 117 (1960) (holding that the burden of establishing the fact
that the evidence is within the terms of the statute creating the privilege is on the party asserting the
privilege).
58. CAL. Evm. CODE § 913(a) (West 1966).
59. CAL GOV'T CODE g 11507.6(f) (West 1992); see Kizer v. Sulnick, 202 CaL App. 3d 431,
440-41, 248 Cal. Rptr. 712,717-18 (1988) (stating that the protection of the work product doctrine
has been extended to testimony as well as discovery in both civil and criminal cases and it even
applies if the attorney is working in a non-adversarial context).
60. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
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evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is inad-
missable in a state court.62 Although the exclusionary rule is usually
only applied in criminal cases, it has been applied in some civil cases
when it advances the aims and objectives of criminal law enforce-
ment.
63
The exclusionary rule has generally been held inapplicable in
administrative proceedings; however, in determining whether the
exclusionary rule is to be used in an administrative hearing, the
California Supreme Court has identified several factors that must be
balanced: (1) Whether the purposes of the proceeding are similar to
the aims and objectives of criminal law enforcement; (2) whether
application of the rule would serve any real deterrence to illegal
searches and seizures in the type of case; (3) the social consequences
of its application; and (4) whether the evidence was obtained under
circumstances that shock the conscience.64 However, since it cannot
be known with certainty ahead of time whether a judge will apply the
rule or not, counsel should make it a practice to object to illegally
obtained evidence at the administrative level as early as possible by
a written motion in limine in advance of the hearing or during a pre-
hearing conference.
61. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
62. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
63. See People v. One 1960 Cadillac Coupe, 62 Cal. 2d 92, 96, 396 P. 2d 706,709,41 Cal.
Rptr. 290, 293 (1964) (finding that the exclusionary rule can be used in a proceeding for forfeiture
of a car used in unlawful transportation of marijuana when there was a close identity to the aims and
objectives of criminal law enforcement); see also People v. Moore, 69 Cal. 2d 674, 682, 446 P.2d
800, 804-805, 72 Cal. Rptr. 800, 805-06 (1968) (applying the exclusionary rule in a civil narcotic
addict commitment proceeding that was closely identified with the aims and objectives of criminal
law enforcement and the deterrent policy for applying the rule), overruled on other grounds in People
v. Thomas, 19 Cal. 3d 630, 637-38, 566 P.2d 228, 232, 139 Cal. Rptr. 594, 598 (1977).
64. Emislie v. State Bar, 11 Cal. 3d 210, 227-28, 520 P. 2d 991, 1000, 113 Cal. Rptr. 175,
184-84 (1974) (in applying these factors, the court determined that the rule was not applicable in state
bar disciplinary proceedings); see Governing Bd. v. Metcalf, 36 Cal. App. 3d 546, 549, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 724, 762 (1974) (stating that one of the policies underlying the exclusionary rule in both civil
and criminal cases is to preserve the integrity of the judicial process); In re Martinez, I Cal. 3d 641,
649-50,463 P.2d 734, 739, 83 Cal. Rptr. 382, 388-89 (1970) (refusing to apply the exclusionary rule
to exclude an illegally obtained confession in a parole revocation proceeding since there was
practically no deterrent effect to be gained by its application, but also stating that exclusion may be
proper if the confession had been coerced or had resulted from egregious police conduct).
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5. Presumptions
Even though the California APA does not specifically refer to the
use of presumptions in an administrative proceeding, the pre-
sumptions applicable in court proceedings are also used at the
administrative level.' For purposes of this Article, the most note-
worthy presumptions concern the use of chemical tests when a person
is arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. There are
basically three such presumptions used in administrative proceedings
which relate to the use of chemical tests. First, according to
California Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (b), "it is a
rebuttable presumption that the person had 0.08 percent or more, by
weight, of alcohol in his or her blood at the time of driving the
vehicle if the person had 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol
in his or her blood at the time of the performance of a chemical test
within three hours after the driving."" Therefore, if a person is
arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol and performs a
chemical test more than three hours after being originally stopped,
the presumption in section 23152, subdivision (b) does not apply. In
other words, when a chemical test is administered more than three
hours after a person has been detained for driving under the influence
of alcohol, the claim that a person had a blood alcohol level of more
than 0.08 percent at the time of driving enjoys no legal presumption
and that fact must be shown to be true by a preponderance of the
evidence.67 Second, courts have generally recognized that tests
65. See CAL. Evm. CODE §§ 600-669.5 (West 1966 & Supp. 1992) (providing for
presumptions in court proceedings).
66. CAL. VEH. CODE § 23152(b) (West Supp. 1992) (emphasis added); see also Burge v.
Department of Motor Vehicles, 5 Cal. App. 4th 384, 391, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5, 9 (1992) (citing the
rebuttable presumption contained in § 23152, subdivision (b)). The court in Burge stated that since
the Legislature, recognizing that breath tests are taken within three hours after driving, determined
that independent proof of this fact need not be offered, there can be "no reason" why the Legislature
would choose to accept the fact as presumed in criminal prosecutions but not in administrative
proceedings. Id.
67. See Santos v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 5 Cal. App. 4th 537, 549, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d
10, 16-17 (1992) (finding that since there was no record of when the blood sample was taken, there
can be no presumption since it cannot be said that the test was given within three hours of operating
a motor vehicle).
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performed by authorized laboratories are presumptively valid.68
Finally, Evidence Code section 664 contains the presumption that
"official duty has been regularly performed."' Although these three
presumptions appear to present insurmountable obstacles for an
attorney to overcome, it must be remembered that these presumptions
are rebuttable. The following cases discuss the interrelationship of
these presumptions as well as the evidence needed to effectively
rebut them.
In Coombs v. Pierce,7" the Fifth District Court of Appeal was
faced with the issue of who has the burden of proof regarding the
reliability of a breath test utilized to show a driver's blood-alcohol
level at the time of arrest.7 Coombs argued that the Department of
Motor Vehicles failed to lay a proper foundation required to show the
scientific evidence of Coombs' blood-alcohol level was admissible
in the administrative proceeding.72 The court recognized that when
testing equipment is in compliance with the state Department of
Health licensing requirements, the machine is presumed reliable."
68. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
69. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 664 (West 1966) (providing for the statutory presumption that
"official duty has been regularly performed").
70. 1 Cal. App. 4th 568,2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 249 (1991).
71. Coombs, 1 Cal. App. 4th at 579,2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 255 (1991). Coombs was arrested by
a California Highway Patrol officer for driving under the influence of alcohol and Coombs completed
a breath test with the results of .16 and .17. Id. at 573, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 251. The Department of
Motor Vehicles suspended Coombs' privilege to drive for driving with an excessive blood-alcohol
level pursuant to California Vehicle Code § 13353.2. Id. Coombs filed a writ of mandate in the
superior court, which was denied. Id. at 573-74,2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 251. Coombs appealed to the court
of appeal, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence introduced to show his blood-alcohol level by
attacking the foundational requirements necessary to support scientific evidence. Id. at 576, 2 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 253.
72. Id. at 576, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 253.
73. Id. at 580,2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 255-56; see, Imachi v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 2 Cal.
App. 4th 809, 816-817, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 478, 481-82 (1992) (holding that tests performed by
authorized laboratories have been held to be presumptively valid). In finding that a report of a
chemical test is presumptively valid, the Imachi court reasoned that such reports have the requisite
indicia of trustworthiness:
Chemical tests to determine blood-alcohol concentration at the time of the arrest are
performed by forensic laboratories which must comply with procedures set out in the
California Code of Regulations. ([CAL.] HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 436.50; CAL. CODE
REGS. tit. 17, §§ 1215-1220.4) These regulations include requirements for forensic
laboratories and analysts, collection and handling of samples and methods of analysis.
Methods of analysis must be in accord with specified standards of performance and
procedure (including the requirement that instruments used for alcohol analysis must be
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However, when such licensing is not present, the proponent of the
evidence must show scientific reliability through traditional found-
ational evidence.74 In order to meet the traditional prerequisites for
admission of breath test evidence, the proponent must establish that:
(1) The equipment was in proper working order; (2) the testing pro-
cedure was properly administered; and (3) the person operating the
testing equipment was competent and properly qualified.75
The testing equipment utilized to establish Coombs' blood-
alcohol level was not licensed by the state and the Department of
Motor Vehicles did not present any evidence of the traditional
prerequisites for admissibility.76 The Department of Motor Vehicles
argued that the Legislature intended the results obtained from
equipment utilized to show blood-alcohol levels to be presumed
reliable and that a driver should have the burden of overcoming such
a presumption. 77 The court of appeal disagreed, stating that even
though reports presented without proof of reliability are sufficient to
support an initial summary finding of license suspension, once a
hearing is requested, the report is insufficient to establish a prima
facie showing of facts necessary to support the suspension of a
driver's license.7' Therefore, when breath test evidence of a driver's
blood-alcohol level is submitted in an administrative proceeding, the
equipment utilized to test the driver's breath must either be properly
in good working order and be routinely checked for accuracy and precision (CAL. CODE
REos. tit. 17, § 1220.2, subd. (a)(5)) as well as a quality control program adopted by the
Department of Health Services. (CAL. CODE REOS. tit. 17, §§ 1220.1, 1220.2, 1220.3).
Id.; see also Burge v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 5 Cal. App. 4th 384, 389 n.1, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d
5, 8 n.1 (1992) (citing Imachi with approval).
74. Coombs, 1 Cal. App. 4th at 580,2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 255-56; see People v. Adams, 59 Cal.
App. 3d 559, 567, 131 Cal. Rptr. 190, 195 (1976) (holding that noncompliance with licensing
regulations goes only to the weight of the evidence when foundational prerequisites of admissibility
are independently established).
75. Coombs, 1 Cal. App. 4th at 576, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 253; see Adams, 59 Cal. App. 3d at
561, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 191 (discussing foundational requirements for admissibility of testing results).
76. Coombs, 1 Cal. App. 4th at 580, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 255-56.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 581, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 256; see Daniels v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 33 Cal.
3d 532,541,658 P.2d 1313, 1319, 189 Cal. Rptr. 512,518 (1983) (quoted in Coombs) (holding that
reports alone are insufficient to support a license suspension at an administrative hearing).
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licensed by the state, or the proponent must establish the traditional
prerequisites for admissibility of the test results. 79
In Santos v. Department of Motor Vehicles, the First District
Court of Appeal was faced with the same issue as presented in
Coombs: who has the burden of proof regarding the reliability of a
breath test.80 In Santos, the primary evidence of respondent's blood
alcohol level was a laboratory report of the blood test.8 The court
noted that because of the presumption regarding the validity of
chemical tests, the traditional foundational requirements for chemical
tests are not ordinarily required in the absence of evidence that the
test was not properly performed or that the forensic laboratory was
not properly licensed. 2 As a result of the presumption, the court
determined that the burden was shifted to the licensee to demonstrate
that the test was not properly performed. 3 However, the report of
the blood test failed to indicate the time the blood sample was
taken.84 Santos' expert testified that in order to determine the blood-
alcohol level at the time of drawing, it was critical to know when the
blood sample was takenY Since the Department did not rebut the
expert testimony that the test results failed to accurately prove the
blood-alcohol level, the court held that Santos had rebutted the
presumption in section 23152, subdivision (b), and that the
Department failed to meet its burden of proof. 6
Finally, in Davenport v. Department v. Motor Vehicles, the
Second District Court of Appeal was confronted with the issue of
79. Coombs, 1 Cal. App. 4th at 581, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 256.
80. 5 Cal. App. 4th 537, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 10 (1992).
81. Santos, 5 Cal. App. 4th at 546, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 14.
82. Id. at 550, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17 (citing Imachi v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 2 Cal.
App. 4th 809, 816, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 478, 481-82 (1992)).
83. Id. at 547, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 15.
84. Id. at 547, 7 CaL Rptr. 2d at 16.
85. Id. at 548, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17. Santos' expert testified that the blood-alcohol levels rise
for a period of time after a drink is consumed, so that a test administered shortly after consumption
would be lower than a test performed later when the alcohol had reached its maximum level. Id.
86. Id. at 549, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 18. The court specifically stated that no presumption can
supply the missing information when a report of a chemical test fails to indicate the time the sample
was drawn. Id. at 550, 7 CaL Rptr. 2d at 17. Therefore, since there is was no evidence as to the time
that the test was given, there can be no presumption that the test was given within three hours of
driving a vehicle. Id. at 549 n.8, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 16 n.8.
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whether the Department of Motor Vehicles can rely on the rebuttable
presumption contained in Evidence Code section 664 to prove that
the licensee was driving with a blood-alcohol concentration in
violation of section 13353.2.s7 Evidence Code section 664 provides
that "it is presumed that official duty has been regularly per-
formed.""8 An "official duty" is imposed upon law enforcement
agencies and their officers and employees to perform blood alcohol
analyses by methods devised to assure reliability. 9
In concluding that the Department of Motor Vehicles could rely
on the presumption contained in section 664, the court stated that the
presumption effectively places the burden upon the licensee to
establish "the nonexistence of the foundational trustworthiness of the
report as a whole, and in particular, the nonexistence of the
foundational reliability of tests upon which the report is partly
based."9° The court went on to find that if the information in the
report was the result of direct observations and was within the
personal knowledge of the reporting officer, then the report,
including the results of blood tests administered by the officer, will
constitute sufficient evidence to support a suspension of the
licensee's driving privilege.91 Since Davenport failed to introduce
any evidence that the test was not reliable, he did not rebut the
87. 6 Cal. App. 4th 133, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 818 (1992).
88. CAL. EvID. CODE § 664 (West 1966).
89. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 436.52 (West 1990) (authorizing the Department
of Health Services to establish regulations governing the procedures to be used by law enforcement
agencies in administering breath tests for the purposes of determining the concentration of ethyl
alcohol in a person's blood); see also CAL. CODE REOs. tit. 17, §§ 1215-1222.2 (1992) (setting forth
detailed standards for the licensing and operation of forensic alcohol laboratories, the training of
personnel, the collection and analysis of samples in general, and the manner of expressing results);
People v Adams, 59 Cal. App. 3d 559, 567, 131 Cal. Rptr. 190, 195 (1976) (finding that compliance
with the regulations establishes both a foundation for admission of test results into evidence in any
proceeding and a basis for finding such results to be legally sufficient evidence to support the
requisite findings in such proceedings).
90. Davenport, 6 Cal. App. 4th at 143, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 825. The court also concluded that
due process is not offended by this allocation of the burden in license suspension proceedings. Id.
at 145, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 826.
91. Id.
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presumption and the court determined that the order of suspension
should be affirmed. 92
Therefore, as a result of the presumptions contained in Vehicle
Code sections 23152, subdivision (b) and Evidence Code section 664,
as well as the presumption regarding chemical tests performed
properly and by a licensed forensic laboratory, the Department of
Motor Vehicles is not required to lay a traditional foundation to admit
such evidence.93 Instead, the burden of proof shifts to the licensee
to show that a presumption should not apply.94 At least one court
has specifically held that due process is not offended by such an
allocation of the burden of proof at license revocation hearings.95
Counsel should also be aware that the use of presumptions
regarding the reliability of intoxilyzer tests has been the subject of
much controversy." One of the main arguments focuses on the use
of statistical averages which, it is argued, cannot be applied to
individuals since there are too many factors that affect each
individual's intoxilyzer results.97 This argument can further be
broken down into two sub-arguments. First, the standard conversion
ratio of 2100:1 ertoneously assmnes tht the same ratio applies to everyone.9
92. Id. at 140,7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 823. Davenport did testify that he consumed 12 to 14 ounces
of wine with dinner, over a period of 2-1/2 to three hours on the night of his arrest, which, according
to his expert witness, would produce a blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) substantially less than .10
percent if properly tested within I to 3 hours after Davenport stopped drinking. Id. However, the
court determined that this type of evidence did not prove that the test was improperly given and
therefore did not properly rebut the presumption as contained within Evidence Code § (64. Id.
93. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing the traditional foundational
requirements for the admission of scientific evidence).
94. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text (discussing the presumptions that shifts in
the burden of proof).
95. Davenport, 6 Cal. App. 4th at 137, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 826.
96. See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text (discussing many of the arguments attacking
the reliability of intoxilyzer tests).
97. See Terrance C. Wade, DUI Statistics Often Don'tAdd Up: Here's How To Change Them
In Court, Vol. 5 CRIMiNAL JusTiCE 1, 19 (1990).
98. The ratio of 2100:1 represents the average breath-alcohol concentration (BrAC) to blood
alcohol concentration (BAC). It has been argued that an average cannot be applied to the vast
majority of people who aren't average; instead, the appropriate statistic is the "range" which extends
from at least 1100:1 to 3400:1. See Terrance C. Wade, DUIStatistics Often Don'tAdd Up: Here's
How To Change Them In Court, Vol. 5 CRmNAL JusmcE 1, 19 (1990). Furthermore, when repeated
measurements of the combined blood-breath alcohol ratio were taken over longer periods of time,
variations as much as 1100 to 1300 were found within the same person. Id. Consequently, a person's
true blood breath ratio may be less than half the average ratio of 2100:1 used by the intoxilyzer. See
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Second, statutes erroneously assume that alcohol is absorbed and
eliminated at the same rates by everyone.99 In addition, it has been
recognized that since intoxilyzer tests are well-accepted methods of
determining a person's blood-alcohol level, there is no need for the
Department of Motor Vehicles to comply with the principles set forth
in People v. Kelly' and Frye v. United States'' requiring
foundational evidence as to the general acceptance of a new scientific
method. °2
As is evident from the above discussion, evidentiary rules
regarding the use of presumptions provide the Department of Motor
Vehicles with a very potent weapon in administrative per se hearings.
T.A.A., et al., Significance of Variations in Blood: Breath Partition Coefficient of Alcohol, 2 Bur.
MED. J. 1479 (1976). Fimally, even a person's body temperature can adversely affect an intoxilyzer
test; every degree of increase in the body temperature can cause an increase of 7 percent to 9 percent
in BrAC which the intoxilyzer does not take into account See M. F. Mason & K. M. Dubowski,
Breath-Alcohol Analysis: Uses, Methods, and Some Forensic Problems-Review and Opinion, 21 J.
FORENSIC SCIENCE 9 (1976).
99. The alcohol absorption rate occurs more rapidly on an empty stomach; however, even then
an individual may not reach his or her peak alcohol concentration for up to three hours after
consumption of the alcohol. See Kurt M. Dubowski, Human Pharmacokinetics of Ethanol: Further
Studies, 22 CuNIcAL CHm sTRY 1199 (1976). On the other hand, when alcohol is consumed after
eating or while eating food, the alcohol is, for the most part, retained in the stomach with the food.
See M.F. Mason & K.M. Dubowski, Alcoho4 Traffic, and Chemical Testing in the United States: A
Resume and Some Remaining Problems, 20 CINIcAL CHEMIsTRY 126 (1974); Ken Smith, Science,
the Intoxilyzer and BreathAlcohol Testing, THE CHAMPION, May 4,1987 (discussing the relationship
that eating has on alcohol retention in the stomach). Finally, trauma, which may occur as the result
of an accident or even from being arrested, often causes the stomach to retain its contents for hours
or even days. See also, E. F. Rose, Factors Influencing Gastric Emptying, 24 J. FORENsIc SCIENCE
200 (1979).
Furthermore, according to statistical averages, the alcohol elimination rate is 0.0 15 percent BAC
per hour, however, individual elimination rates can vary from as little as 0.006 percent and up to 0.04
percent BAC per hour. See M. Bogusz, Comparative Studies on the Rate of Ethanol Elimination, 22
I. FoRENSIc SCENCE 446 (1977); KuRT M. DUBOWSi, ALCOHOL AND TRAFFIc SAFErY (United
States Department of Health Education, and Welfare, Public Health Service Pub No. 1043, 1961).
As a result, it may take some individuals more than twice as long as the average to eliminate the
same BAC. This factor makes the timing of the test critical since a later test result will "always be
of uncertain validity and therefore forensically unacceptable." K. M. Dubowski, Absorption,
Distribution and Elimination ofAlcohoL" Highway Safety, 10 J. STUDIES ON ALCOHOL 98,106 (Supp.
1985).
100. 17 Cal. 3d 24, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976).
101. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)
102. Imachi at 817 n.6, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 482 n.6; see also Burge v. Department of Motor
Vehicles, 5 Cal. App. 4th 384,389,7 Cal. Rptr. 5,8 (1992) (citing Imachi with approval); McKinney
v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 5 Cal. App. 4th 519, 525, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 18, 22 (1992)
(recognizing that the validity of blood tests has been accepted for more than 30 years).
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This is especially true in light of the fact that the APA has liberalized
the rules relating to the use of hearsay in such proceedings,
essentially allowing the admission of otherwise inadmissible
evidence. Although the APA attempts to provide various due process
protections in administrative proceedings, the liberalized evidentiary
rules used in license suspension proceedings potentially threaten to
undermine the fundamental right to a fair hearing.
B. Requirements to Sustain Suspension
As stated earlier, prior to 1990, a person's privilege to drive an
automobile could be suspended or revoked in an alcohol related
incident only if the driver was convicted of driving under the
influence of an alcoholic beverage and/or drug, if the driver was
convicted of driving with an excessive blood alcohol concentration
or while addicted to narcotics, or if the driver refused to submit to
chemical testing.' After the passage of Senate Bill 1623, the
Department of Motor Vehicles was authorized to suspend or revoke
a person's privilege to drive an automobile for having a blood-
alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more, regardless of whether the
driver was convicted of an alcohol related offense in the criminal
courts."° This section will discuss the provisions of the Vehicle
Code authorizing suspension for driving with a specified blood-
alcohol level0 5 and for refusing to complete a chemical test."°
1. Blood-Alcohol Level of O.08 Percent or More
California Vehicle Code section 13353.3 provides that the
Department of Motor Vehicles must suspend a person's driver's
license if the driver was operating or in actual control of a motor
vehicle while the driver's blood-alcohol level was 0.08 percent or
more."17 Under this statute, when a person is arrested for a violation
103. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
104. CAL. VE. CODE § 13353.2(a) (West Supp. 1992).
105. See infra notes 107-114 and accompanying text.
106. See infra notes 115-142 and accompanying text.
107. CAL. VEH. CODE § 13353.3(a) (West Supp. 1992).
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of Vehicle Code section 23152 or 23153, and is determined to have
a blood alcohol level of at least 0.08 percent, the arresting officer is
required to serve the person with notice of an administrative order
suspending his or her driving privileges.' The suspension order
served by the officer becomes effective 45 days after service of the
notice." That notice must include the reason and statutory grounds
for the suspension, the right to request an administrative hearing, and
the date when a request must be made to receive a determination
prior to the effective date of the suspension.'10
In order to sustain the suspension order, the Department of Motor
Vehicles has the evidentiary burden of proving the facts necessary to
justify its order.' More specifically, the Department of Motor
Vehicles itself must automatically review the order to determine, by
a preponderance of the evidence, the following issues: (1) Whether
the officer had reasonable cause to believe that the person violated
section 23152 or 23153; (2) whether the person was placed under
arrest; and (3) whether the person with a blood-alcohol level of 0.08
percent or more was driving or was in actual physical control of the
vehicle.12
The general rules providing for the period of suspension are set
forth in section 13353.3 of the Vehicle Code. The driving privileges
of first time offenders are suspended for six months, while those of
repeat offenders are suspended for a period of one year.1 3 Of
course, the Department of Motor Vehicles' determination is subject
to a petition for judicial review."'
108. IR § 23158.5(a) (West Supp. 1992).
109. Id § 13353.3(a) (West Supp. 1992).
110. Id § 13353.2(c) (West Supp. 1992).
111. Burge v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 5 Cal. App. 4th 384, 388,7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 5,7
(1992); see Coombs v. Pierce, I Cal. App. 4th 568,580-81,2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 249,255 (1991) (citing
Daniels v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 33 Cal. 3d 532,536,658 P.2d 1313, 1315, 189 Cal. Rptr.
512, 514 (1983) (holding that the initiating administrative agency has the burden of proving the facts
necessary to support an action to suspend or revoke a license)); see also supra note 22 (discussing
burden of proof).
112. CAL. VEH. CODE § 13557(b)(2) (West Supp. 1992); Agresti v. Department of Motor
Vehicles, 5 Cal. App. 4th 599, 603, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 353, 355 (1992).
113. CAL. VEH. CODE § 13353.3 (West Supp. 1992).
114. Id. § 13559(a) (West Supp. 1992); see infra notes 184-192 and accompanying text
(discussing review procedures).
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2. Refusal or Failure to Complete a Test
California Vehicle Code section 23157 provides that any person
who operates a motor vehicle in the State of California is deemed to
have given his or her consent to chemical testing for the purpose of
determining the driver's blood-alcohol level if the driver has been
lawfully arrested for an alcohol or drug related driving offense 115
This section, often referred to as the Implied Consent Statute, also
provides that any person who is unconscious or in a condition that
renders the person incapable of refusing is deemed not to have
withdrawn his or her consent to such testing. "6 A driver may refuse
to submit to a chemical test, but such action exacts a penalty for
refusal. California Vehicle Code section 13353, subdivision (a),
provides that any person who refuses or fails to complete a chemical
test upon an officer's request shall have his or her driving privilege
suspended upon receipt of the officer's sworn statement that the
officer had reasonable cause to believe the driver was operating a
motor vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 23152 or 23153
and that the driver refused to submit to or failed to complete a
chemical test after a proper request. 7
The notice of the order of suspension is normally served on the
driver by the arresting officer.118 The Department of Motor
Vehicles must perform a review of the record after receipt of an
officer's sworn statement describing the refusal or failure to complete
a test."9 This review is limited to consideration of: (1) Whether the
arresting officer had reasonable cause to believe the driver was
operating a motor vehicle in violation of California Vehicle Code
section 23152 or 23153; (2) whether the driver was placed under
arrest for such violation; (3) whether the driver refused or failed to
complete a chemical test after a proper request; and (4) whether the
115. CA. VE. CODE § 23157(a) (West Supp. 1992).
116. Id § 23157(a)(2)(C)(5) (West Supp. 1992).
117. Id § 13353(a) (West Supp. 1992).
118. Id § 13353(b) (West Supp. 1992). However, if the notice is not served on tho driver by
the arresting officer, or the officer who observed the refusal, the Department of Motor Vehicles must
immediately notify the driver in writing of the suspension. Id.
119. Id § 13353(c) (West Supp. 1992).
484
1993 / Admin Per Se For The Practitioner
driver had been informed of the consequences of a refusal or failure
to complete the requested test or tests.120 If any one of these
findings are not supported by a preponderance of the evidence, the
Department of Motor Vehicles may not suspend the driver's privilege
to operate a motor vehicle.12 1 If the Department of Motor Vehicles
chooses to suspend the driver's privilege to operate a motor vehicle,
the driver may request an administrative hearing on the sus-
pension." Although the administrative suspension procedure for
refusing or failing to complete a chemical test is not new, the cases
discussing this procedure that have been published since the
inception of the admin per se statutes have been included to inform
the practitioner of several nuances that may or may not be
successfully applied in administrative proceedings.
For example, in Hughey v. Department of Motor Vehicles,123
the Third District Court of Appeal was asked to decide if diminished
capacity was a defense to a suspension for refusing to take a chemical
test pursuant to section 23157."2 The Sacramento County Superior
Court had decided that Hughey was rendered incapable of refusing
a chemical test due to severe head trauma caused in an accident
preceding his arrest, and issued a writ of mandate ordering the
Department of Motor Vehicles to reinstate his driving privileges."
120. Id. § 13353(c) (West Supp. 1992).
121. Hughey v.Department of Motor Vehicles,235 Cal. App. 3d 752,758,1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 115,
118 (1991); Janusch v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 276 Cal. App. 2d 193, 196,80 Cal. Rptr. 726,
728 (1969).
122. CAL. VEH. CODE § 13353(d) (West Supp. 1992). The request for an administrative hearing
does not operate to stay the order of suspension or revocation. Id.
123. 235 Cal. App. 3d 752, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 115 (1991).
124. Hughey, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 754-55, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 116.
125. Id. at 754, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 166. Hughey was involved in a single vehicle motorcycle
accident where he lost control of his vehicle at 45 miles per hour and ran into a fence. Id. at 755,
1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 116. Hughey was not wearing a helmet at the time of the accident. Id. Public safety
personnel attempted to administer medical care, but Hughey refused. Id. The investigating officer then
placed Hughey under arrest and transported him to jail. Id. at 755-56, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 117. At the
jail, the investigating officer read Hughey the required admonition. Id. at 756, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 117.
In response to the officers' blood, breath or urine question, Hughey stated, -I'm not taking any
test-just let me go, I'll show you something too cool man." Id. The investigating officer took this
statement for a refusal, although he testified at the administrative hearing that the comment made no
sense. Id. After being released from jail, Hughey was admitted to a hospital where he remained for
five days. Id. At the administrative hearing, a neurologist testified that Hughey had suffered a serious
head injury from the accident, and that such an injury would have made it "difficult, if not
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On appeal, the Department of Motor Vehicles argued that the
evidence was insufficient to sustain the superior court's decision.126
The court of appeal understood the Department of Motor Vehicles'
argument to mean that an arresting officer's "reasonable judgment"
should be the controlling issue in determining whether a driver is
capable of refusing a chemical test. 7
The crux of the Department of Motor Vehicles' case focused on
the Implied Consent statutes. 2 According to Vehicle Code section
23157, any person who is unconscious or in a condition rendering the
person "incapable of refusal" is deemed not to have withdrawn
consent to submit to a chemical test.129 However, refusal to submit
to a chemical test withdraws the consent impliedly given. 13' The
court of appeal held that because of the incapable of refusal language
in California Vehicle Code section 23157,3 a person who is in a
impossible, for Hughey to have understood the admonition delivered by the officer, nor would have
Hughey have understood the significance of his refusal to submit." Id. The expert also testified "It
was unlikely that alcohol caused [Hughey's] behavior."Id. After the administrative hearing, Hughey's
driver's license was suspended. Id. at 754, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 116. Hughey sought review by filing
for a writ of administrative mandate in the superior court. Id. The superior court ruled that the
Department of Motor Vehicles findings were not supported by the evidence. Id. The superior court
held that the arresting officer did not have reasonable cause to believe Hughey had been driving
under the influence of alcohol and that Hughey was rendered incapable of refusing a chemical test
due to his head trauma caused in the accident preceding his arrest. Id.
126. Id. at 755, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 116. In its decision to affirm the superior court, the court of
appeal determined that because a person may, in an administrative hearing, defend a refusal to submit
to a chemical test, it was unnecessary to review the trial court's decision that the arresting officer
lacked probable cause to arrest Id.
127. Id. In other words, the Department of Motor Vehicles asked the court of appeal to rule
that a person cannot submit evidence of lack of capacity to refuse a chemical test in an implied-
consent hearing. Id.
128. See CAL. VEI. CODE § 23157(a)(I) (West Supp. 1992) (stating that any person who
operates a motor vehicle is deemed to have consented to chemical testing to determine the alcohol
or drug content the driver's blood); 1986 Cal. Stat. ch. 527, sec. 4, at 1881 (amending CAL. VEl.
CODE § 13353) (stating that the issues to be covered during an administrative hearing for refusal to
test shall be limited to: (1) The arresting officer's probable cause to arrest for California Vehicle
Code §§ 23152 or 23153; (2) whether the driver was placed under arrest; (3) whether the driver
actually refused or failed to complete a chemical test after a test was requested; and (4) whether the
driver had been properly admonished regarding the consequences of a refusal or incomplete test); see
also CAL. VEi. CODE § 23152 (West Supp. 1992) (driving under the influence of alcohol and/or any
drug); § 23153 (West Supp. 1992) (driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs causing
bodily injury).
129. CAL. VE. CODE § 23157(a)(5) (West Supp. 1992).
130. Hughey, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 757, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 118.
131. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 23157(a)(5) (West Supp. 1992).
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condition that renders the person incapable of refusing a chemical
test is deemed not to have withdrawn consent.132 The court noted
that a self-induced condition, particularly a condition resulting from
the consumption of alcohol, does not excuse failure to take a test.
133
However,
[i]f... the driver is able to convince a trier of fact that he or she was
incapable of refusing a test for reasons unconnected with the consumption
of alcohol, the statute contemplates a restoration of the driver's license..
..If the driver presents expert testimony of his incapacity to refuse a test
which convinces the trier of fact, this is permitted under section 23157,
subdivision (a)(5).134
Thus, the defense of incapacity to refuse a chemical test in an
implied-consent hearing has been judicially upheld. 135
Another case dealing with the issue of whether a driver refused
to submit to a chemical test is Payne v. Department of Motor
132. Hughey, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 758, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d'at 118. The Department of Motor
Vehicles argued that California Vehicle Code § 23157, subdivision (a)(5), should be interpreted to
mean that evidence of the driver's incapacity to refuse a chemical test may not be introduced if the
arresting officer acted "reasonably." Id. In other words, the only issue to be determined at the
administrative proceeding would be whether the arresting officer acted reasonably in deciding the
driver's capacity to refuse the test. Id. at 758-59, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 118-19. Thus, if the
administrative hearing officer decided that the arresting officer acted reasonably, it would be an
irrebuttable presumption that the driver did in fact have the capacity to refuse a chemical test. Id.
133. Id. at 759, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 119; see McDonnell v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 45
Cal. App. 3d 653, 662-63, 119 Cal. Rptr. 804, 810-11 (1975) (holding that an impaired judgment
defense cannot exist in an implied consent case where voluntary consumption of alcohol caused the
impairment in part); Goodman v. Orr, 19 Cal. App. 3d 845, 857, 97 Cal. Rptr. 226, 234 (1971)
(holding that self-intoxication is not a defense to refusing a chemical test); Bush v. Bright, 264 Cal.
App. 2d 788, 792, 71 Cal. Rptr. 123, 125-26 (1968) (holding that allowing a person too intoxicated
through a self-induced condition to understand the consequences of a refusal to test admonishment
would frustrate the purposes of the Legislature).
134. Hughey, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 762, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 121.
135. Id. at 768, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 125. However, Justice Puglia included a caveat in his
concurring opinion, warning that if medical experts are allowed to testify at administrative hearings
regarding a driver's incapacity to refuse a chemical test caused by physical trauma, will not "those
experts who minister to psychological and emotional trauma be far behind?" Id. at 770, 1 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 126 (Puglia, PJ., concurring). Justice Puglia also felt that it was an unfair advantage to allow
drivers the ability to submit expert testimony regarding capacity to refuse a chemical test without
giving the Department of Motor Vehicles notice sufficient to secure rebuttal testimony. Id. at 770-71,
I Cal. Rptr. 2d at 126. However, "such a requirement would have to be imposed by the Legislature."
Id. at 770, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 127.
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Vehicles.1365 In Payne, the First District Court of Appeal was faced
with the issue of whether a driver's conduct of submitting to a
chemical test without physical resistance, but insisting that the test
was being conducted under protest, constitutes a refusal under
California Vehicle Code section 13353.1 7 The court held that,
under the circumstances of this case, the driver's response that he was
submitting to the test under protest did constitute a refusal.
31
The court stated the test to determine when a driver's conduct
constitutes a refusal under California Vehicle Code section 13353:
In determining whether an arrested driver's conduct amounts to a refusal
to submit to a test, the court looks not to the state of mind of the arrested
driver, but to "the fair meaning to be given [the driver's] response to the
demand he submit to a chemical test."
139
The court went on to state that when a driver places conditions on
consent to a chemical test, such a condition constitutes a refusal
136. 235 Cal. App. 3d 1514, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 528 (1991).
137. Id. at 1517, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 529.
138. Id. at 1520, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 529. Payne was lawfully arrested by a California Highway
Patrol officer for driving under the influence of alcohol after an injury accident. Id. Payne was
advised at the scene of his arrest that he was required to submit to a chemical blood-alcohol test. Id.
Payne told the arresting officer that he would not take any test. Id. Payne was then transported to jail
where he was admonished that his driving privileges would be suspended if he failed or refused to
submit to a chemical test. Id. at 1516-17, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 529. Payne responded that he would only
take a blood test if his personal physician administered the test. Id. The arresting officer explained
to Payne that the nurse at the jail was registered and qualified to take blood samples. Id. The
arresting officer then told Payne that the nurse would take the blood sample, and that Payne was in
violation of California Vehicle Code § 13353. Id. Payne then submitted to the test without physical
resistance, however, he insisted that the blood sample was being taken "under protest." Id. Tho
Department of Motor Vehicles revoked Payne's driving privileges for refusing to submit to a
chemical test pursuant to California Vehicle Code § 13353. Id. Payne petitioned the superior court
for a writ of mandate to set aside the Department of Motor Vehicles' order to revoke his driver's
license. Id. The superior court granted the writ. Id. The Department of Motor Vehicles appealed. Id.
139. Id. at 1518, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 529-30; see Barrie v. Alexis, 151 Cal. App. 3d 1157, 1161,
199 Cal. Rptr. 258, 260 (1984) (quoted in Payne v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 235 Cal. App.
3d 1514, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 528 (1991)) (holding that the determinative factor in a refusal to test case
is the objective response of the driver to a demand to submit to a chemical test); Cole v. Department
of Motor Vehicles, 139 Cal. App. 3d 870, 874, 189 Cal. Rptr. 249, 252 (1983) (holding the same).
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within the meaning of California Vehicle Code section 13353.'40
However, the court emphasized that a driver does have the right to
request and receive assurance of the qualifications of the individual
administering the test.141 Therefore, with the exception of a request
for qualifications of the person administering a blood test, a driver
who places a condition on consent to take a chemical test or submits
to a chemical test under protest will be deemed to have refused to
submit to a chemical test under California Vehicle Code section
13353, and risks administrative license suspension or revocation.142
In sum, although a driver must submit to a chemical test to
determine his or her blood-alcohol level if arrested for an alcohol or
drug related driving offense, it is possible to defend a license
suspension or revocation for refusing to submit to the test if the
driver was incapable of refusing because of a non-self induced
condition at the time of the refusal. However, submitting to the
testing procedure "under protest" will expose the driver to potential
penalty for "refusing" to submit to the test.
C. Requirements for Reinstatement
If the Department of Motor Vehicles has improperly decided to
suspend a person's privilege to operate a motor vehicle, the driver
must attempt to obtain judicial review of that decision, 143 and ask
the reviewing court to set aside the suspension order. This section
will review those cases that have attempted to obtain a set aside by
arguing either that the Department of Motor Vehicle's decision to
140. Payne, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 1518, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 530; see Webb v. Miller, 187 Cal.
App. 3d 619,626,232 Cal. Rptr. 50, 54 (1986) (holding that a conditional consent to test constitutes
refusal); Cole v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 139 Cal. App. 3d 870, 873, 189 CaL Rptr. 249, 252
(1983) (holding that a conditional acceptance to test is tantamount to a refusal); Fallis v. Department
of Motor Vehicles, 264 Cal. App. 2d 373, 382, 70 Cal. Rptr. 595, 601 (1968) (holding that a person
who conditions submission to a chemical test on administration by his own physician has refused to
take the test as provided by statute).
141. Payne, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 1519, 1 Cal Rptr. 2d at 530-31; see Ross v. Department of
Motor Vehicles, 219 Cal. App. 3d 398,402,268 Cal. Rptr. 102, 104 (1990) (holding that an arrestee
must be informed of the qualifications of the person administering a blood test if hesitation is
expressed).
142. Payne, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 1520, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 531.
143. See infra notes 184-192 and accompanying text (discussing judicial review procedures).
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suspend was collaterally estopped by a prior decision of a criminal
court, 14 or that the Department was required to reinstate the
driver's license because the driver had been acquitted of the criminal
charges. 145
1. Collateral Estoppel
The administrative per se laws specifically provide that the
determination of the facts at the hearing "is a civil matter which is
independent of the determination of the person's guilt or innocence,
shall have no collateral estoppel effect on a subsequent criminal pro-
secution, and shall not preclude the litigation of the same or similar
facts in the criminal proceeding. " 146 This, along with the related
issue of what exactly constitutes an acquittal, 47 has been an area
of much litigation between drivers and the Department of Motor
Vehicles.
In Zapata v. Department of Motor Vehicles,148 the First District
Court of Appeal was faced with the issue of whether a municipal
court's suppression order collaterally estopped the Department of
Motor Vehicles from relitigating the issue of whether Zapata was
lawfully arrested. 149 The Department of Motor Vehicles argued that
144. See infra notes 146-155 and accompanying text.
145. See infra notes 156-183 and accompanying text.
146. CAI. VE. CODE § 13353.2(e) (West Supp. 1992). Vehicle Code § 13558 specifically
provides that "a determination of facts by the department upon a hearing pursuant to this section has
no collateral estoppel effect on a subsequent criminal prosecution and does not preclude litigation of
those same facts in the criminal proceeding." See id. § 13558(g) (West Supp. 1992).
147. See infra, notes 156-183 and accompanying text (discussing acquittal requirements).
148. 2 Cal. App. 4th 108, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 855 (1991).
149. Zapata, 2 Cal. App. 4th at 111-12,2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857. Zapata was arrested for driving
under the influence of alcohol and refused to submit to a chemical test. Id. at 111, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 857. Before his administrative hearing on the refusal was conducted, Zapata moved in the
municipal court to suppress evidence based on the argument that he was unlawfully arrested. Id. Tho
municipal court conducted an adversarial hearing, and concluded that Zapata was arrested without
probable cause. Id. The district attorney's office then dismissed the charges pending against Zapata.
Id. Two days after the charges were dismissed, the Department of Motor Vehicles held an
administrative hearing on Zapata's refusal to submit to a chemical test Id. Zapata argued that the
Department of Motor Vehicles was collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of whether he was
lawfully arrested, a necessary element of the revocation proceeding. Id; see CAL. VEH. CODE §
13353 (West Supp. 1992) (stating the necessary elements that must be found in order to suspend or
revoke a driver's license). The Department of Motor Vehicles disagreed and revoked Zapata's driving
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it was not collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of the
lawfulness of Zapata's arrest because the district attorney's office
responsible for criminally prosecuting Zapata was not in privity with
the Department of Motor Vehicles.150 The court of appeal first laid
out the traditional requirements of collateral estoppel: (1) The issue
to be precluded from relitigation must be identical to that decided in
a former proceeding; (2) this issue must have been actually litigated
in the former proceeding; (3) the issue must have been necessarily
decided in the former proceeding; (4) the decision in the former
proceeding must be final and on the merits; and (5) the party against
whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity with,
the party in the former proceeding."'
Finding that the first four elements were present, the court in
Zapata focused on the Department's challenge that privity did not
exist between the Department of Motor Vehicles and the district
attorney's office.1 52 Noting that there was an apparent split of
authority, 153 the Zapata court held that because agents of the same
privileges. Zapara, 2 Cal. App. 4th at 111-12, 2 Cal. Rptr. at 857. Zapata filed a writ of mandate in
the superior court. Id. at 112, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857. The superior court agreed with Zapata that the
Department of Motor Vehicles was collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of the lawfulness
of Zapata's arrest and granted the writ. Id. The Department of Motor Vehicles appealed. Id. at 111,
2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 856.
150. Zapata, 2 Cal. App. 4th at 111-12,2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857.
151. Id. at 112,2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857-58 (quoting Lucido v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 335,
341, 795 P.2d 1223, 1225, 272 Cal. Rptr. 767, 769 (1990)); see People v. Simms, 32 Cal. 3d 468,
484, 651 P.2d 321, 331, 186 Cal. Rptr. 77, 87 (1982) (stating the elements of collateral estoppel).
152. Zapata, 2 Cal. App. 4th at 113,2 Cal. Rplr. 2d at 858.
153. The Zapata court pointed out several cases which found that privity existed between a
district attorney's office and the Department of Motor Vehicles for collateral estoppel purposes. U,
at 113,2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 858 (discussing Shackelton v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 46 Cal. App.
3d 327, 119 Cal. Rptr. 921 (1975), and Buttimer v. Alexis, 146 Cal. App. 3d 754, 194 Cal. Rptr. 603
(1983)); see Buttimer v. Alexis, 146 Cal. App. 3d 754, 759-60, 194 Cal. Rptr. 603, 606 (1983)
(fimding privity between the District Attorney's office and the Department of Motor Vehicles);
Shackelton v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 46 Cal. App. 3d 327, 330-31, 119 Cal. Rptr. 921,923-
24 (1975) (holding that the Department of Motor Vehicles is in privity with the prosecuting attorney
of criminal charges related to driving an automobile for purposes of collateral estoppel). However,
the Department of Motor Vehicles argued that the court of appeal should follow the contrary
decisions of Lofthouse v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 124 Cal. App. 3d 730, 177 Cal. Rptr. 601
(1981), and Pawlowski v. Pierce, 202 Cal. App. 3d 692, 249 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1988); see Pawlowsld
v. Pierce, 202 Cal. App. 3d 692, 698, 249 Cal. Rptr. 49,52 (1988) (agreeing with Lofihouse that the
Department of Motor Vehicles is not in privity with the prosecuting attorney for lack of a close
association between the prosecuting attorney and DMV); Lofthouse v. Department of Motor Vehicles,
124 Cal. App. 3d 730, 737, 177 Cal. Rptr. 601, 605 (1981) (holding that the Department of Motor
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government represent the fights of that government, they are in
privity for collateral estoppel purposes. 154 Therefore, because the
Department of Motor Vehicles and the district attorney's office
responsible for criminally prosecuting Zapata were both representing
the same government, i.e., the State of California, they were in privity
and collateral estoppel applied in this Case 155
Although collateral estoppel appears to have been one of the
central issues in admin per se litigation, the most litigated area has
been a similar, yet distinct issue: Whether a driver has been acquitted
of the criminal charges which would trigger mandatory reinstatement
under Vehicle Code section 13353.2.
2. Acquittal
Section 13353.2(e) requires the Department of Motor Vehicles to
reinstate a person's driving privilege if the person is "acquitted" of
related criminal charges. That section provides in part:
If a person is acquitted of criminal charges relating to a determination of
facts under subdivision (a), the department shall immediately reinstate the
Vehicles is not in privity with the prosecutor in a criminal proceeding which charges the driver of
a motor vehicle because DMV has no power to control or intervene in the criminal proceedings);.
The Zapata court distinguished Lofihouse by pointing out that the driver's arrest was not the legal
issue in that case, and ruling that Pawlowski was incorrectly decided. Zapata, 2 Cal. App. 4th at 113-
14, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 858-59; see Lofthouse, 124 Cal. App. 3d at 738, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 605 (stating
that the legality of the driver's arrest was not relevant and was therefore not decided in the prior
litigation).
154. Zapata, 2 Cal. App. 4th at 114,2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 859; see Lerner v. Los Angeles City
Bd. of Educ., 59 Cal. 2d 382, 398, 380 P.2d 97, 106, 29 Cal. Rptr. 657, 666 (1963) (quoted in
Zapata) (holding that agents of the same government are in privity with each other because they
represent the rights of that government); see also People v. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d 468, 487, 651 P.2d 321,
333, 186 Cal. Rptr. 77, 89 (1982) (citing Lerner for the same proposition).
155. Zapata, 2 Cal. App. 4th at 115, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 859. The court went on to analyze
whether any public policy considerations, i.e., judicial integrity, judicial economy, and protection
from vexatious litigation, would preclude application of collateral estoppel. Id. at 115-16,2 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 859-60. After discussing these issues, the court held that public policy considerations did not
preclude application of collateral estoppel in this case and ruled that the Department of Motor
Vehicles was precluded from relitigating the issue the lawfulness of Zapata's arrest. Id. at 116, 2 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 860.
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person's privilege to operate a motor vehicle if the department has
suspended it administratively pursuant to subdivision (a).156
The precise meaning of the words "acquitted of criminal charges
relating to a determination of facts under subdivision (a)" has caused
a great deal of confusion. California Vehicle Code section 13353.2,
subdivision (a), provides that the Department of Motor Vehicles will
suspend a person's privilege to drive if he or she was driving or in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level
of 0.08 percent or more. 157 Because the elements of section
13353.2, subdivision (a), are essentially the same as California
Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (b), an acquittal of the
charge of section 23152, subdivision (b), 151 should trigger the
reinstatement action called for in section 13353.2, subdivision (e).
The interpretation of Vehicle Code section 13353.2 was the issue
to be decided in Agresti v. Department of Motor Vehicles.1 59 In
Agresti, the Fifth District Court of Appeal was asked to decide
whether a dismissal of the charges for driving under the influence of
alcohol in a criminal court required reinstatement of driving pri-
vileges that had been administratively suspended pursuant to
evidence of the underlying arrest.16 The case focused on the
interpretation of California Vehicle Code section 13353.2, sub-
156. CAL. VER. CODE § 13353.2(e) (West Supp. 1992).
157. Id. § 13353.2(a) (West Supp. 1992).
158. See id. § 23152(b) (West Supp. 1992) (providing that- "It is unlawful for any person who
has 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her blood to drive a vehicle.").
159. 5 Cal. App. 4th 559, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 353 (1992).
160. Agresi, 5 Cal. App. 4th at 602, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 354. Agresti had been arrested for
driving under the influence of alcohol at the scene of a reported single vehicle accident although the
arresting officer did not observe Agresti driving the vehicle. Id. at 601-02, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 354.
Agresti submitted to a blood test to determine his blood-alcohol level. Id. at 602, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
354. The test results indicated a blood-alcohol level of 0.09 percent. Id. On the day of Agresti's
scheduled criminal trial, the district attorney's office moved for dismissal, which the court granted.
Id. Over two months after the charges were dismissed, the Department of Motor Vehicles conducted
a formal hearing to determine whether Agresti's driving privileges should be suspended for operating
a vehicle with a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more. Id. After conducting the hearing, the
Department of Motor Vehicles suspended Agresti's driver's license. Id. On a writ of mandate
proceeding, the superior court issued the writ, ruling that because the municipal court had dismissed
the charges, California Vehicle Code § 13353.2, subdivision (e), required the Department of Motor
Vehicles to reinstate Agresti's driving privileges. Id. The Department of Motor Vehicles appealed.
Id. at 601, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 354.
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division (e), which requires the Department of Motor Vehicles to
reinstate a person's suspended driving privileges if the person is
"acquitted" of related criminal charges. 61 Section 13353.2 states
in part:
(a) The department shall immediately suspend the privilege of any
person to operate a motor vehicle if the person was driving or was in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle when the person had 0.08
percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his or her blood.
(e) The determination of the facts in subdivision (a) is a civil matter
which is independent of the determination of the person's guilt or
innocence, shall have no collateral estoppel effect on a subsequent
criminal prosecution, and shall not preclude the litigation of the same or
similar facts in the criminal proceeding. If a person is acquitted of
criminal charges relating to a determination of facts under subdivision (a),
the department shall immediately reinstate the person's privilege to
operate a motor vehicle if the department has suspended it
administratively pursuant to subdivision (a) .... 162
The Department of Motor Vehicles argued that the use of the
term "acquittal" in section 13353.2 should be interpreted to mean "an
adjudication of the facts underlying the administrative
suspension." 63 Agresti argued that because California Penal Code
section 1387 bars a second prosecution of a misdemeanor that has
been dismissed, he was "acquitted" of the underlying charges within
the meaning of section 13353.2.16
The court of appeal noted that the record below did not disclose
the reason for the dismissal, and argued that a dismissal does not
necessarily require a consideration of the merits. 165 Therefore,
161. Id. at 603,2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 355.
162. CAL. Vil. CODE § 13353.2(a), (e) (West Supp. 1992).
163. Agresti, 5 Cal. App. 4th at 604, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 355.
164. Id.; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 1387 (West Supp. 1992) (stating that a dismissal of a
misdemeanor not charged with a felony is a bar to any other prosecution for the same offense).
165. Agrest, 5 Cal. App. 4th at 604, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 356. The court noted that it was not
being asked to decide the effect of a dismissal after a hearing on the merits and how it relates to the
required determination of facts in an administrative hearing. Id. at 605 n.2, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 356 n.2
(citing Zapata v. Department of Motor Vehicles, discussed supra at notes 148-155 and accompanying
text, as an example of these circumstances). The court also stated that it was not deciding whether
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because the term "acquittal" refers to a determination of the
merits, 166 and the record in this case did not reveal a factual
determination of the merits, Agresti was not "acquitted" within the
meaning of California Vehicle Code section 13353.2.67
In Helmandollar v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 68 the Third
District Court of Appeal was asked to decide the issue specifically
not addressed inAgresti: The effect of a dismissal of criminal charges
on the administrative hearing after a criminal court decides an issue
"on the merits" favorable to the defendant."6 In Helmandollar, the
court was faced with a driver who pleaded nolo contendere to
"related" charges of driving under the influence of alcohol, but was
acquitted in the municipal court of driving with a blood-alcohol level
of 0.08 percent or more. 170 On appeal, the court was asked to
a factually compelled dismissal, which occurs after an administrative suspension, would operate as
an acquittal within the meaning of California Vehicle Code § 13353.2, subdivision (e). Agresti, 5 Cal.
App. 4th at 605 n.2, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 356 n.2.
166. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 97 (1978) (quoted in Agresti) (holding that a
criminal defendant is "acquitted" when a court makes a ruling in the defendant's favor which
disposes of a factual element of the charged offense).
167. Agresti, 5 Cal. App. 4th at 607, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 357-58.
168. 7 Cal. App. 4th 52, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 155 (1992).
169. See supra note 165 and accompanying text (discussing the Agresti court's statement that
it was not deciding the effect of a dismissal after a criminal court conducts a hearing on the merits).
170. HelmandoUar, 7 Cal. App:4th at 54,9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156. Helmandollar and Smith (co-
appellant) were drinking together after work. Id. After leaving the bar in separate cars, they crashed
into each other. Id. Between thirty minutes and one hour after the accident, a police officer arrived
and arrested both men for driving under the influence of alcohol. Id. Both were given a breath test
to determine their blood-alcohol level. Id. Each driver registered 0.12 percent on the breath test. Id.
The prosecution apparently felt that it would be difficult to accurately establish the drivers' blood-
alcohol level at the time of driving because the evidence was consistent with a raising blood-alcohol
level. Id. at 54-55, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156. The drivers' waived the right to a jury trial on the charge
of driving with a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more and submitted stipulated facts to the
court. Id. at 55, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156. Based on the stipulated facts, the court found each driver not
guilty of driving with a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more. Id. The prosecutor then amended
the remaining charges of driving under the influence of alcohol, California Vehicle Code § 23152,
subdivision (a), to alcohol-related reckless driving, California Vehicle Code § 23103.5. Id. Each of
the drivers pleaded nolo contendere to the amended charges. Id. Armed with the acquittals,
Helmandollar and Smith demanded the Department of Motor Vehicles to reinstate their driving
privileges which had been administratively suspended. Id. The Department of Motor Vehicles refused,
and the drivers sought a writ of mandate in the superior court. Id., 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156-57. The
superior court denied the writ and the drivers' appealed. Id., 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157; see CAL. VEH.
CODE § 23152(a) (West Supp. 1992) (unlawful to drive a motor vehicle under the influence of
alcohol or any drug); id. § 23152(b) (West Supp. 1992) (unlawful to drive a motor vehicle with a
blood-alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more); id. § 23103.5 (West Supp. 1992) (allowing a prosecutor
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decide whether an acquittal of California Vehicle Code section
23152, subdivision (b), required reinstatement of a driver's privilege
to operate a motor vehicle under California Vehicle Code section
13353.2.171 The Department of Motor Vehicles argued that the
language of California Vehicle Code section 13353.2 requires an
acquittal of all criminal charges relating to the incident. 172 The
court disagreed and held that when a driver has been acquitted of
California Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (b), which
essentially has the same elements as California Vehicle Code section
13353.2, subdivision (a), the driver has been acquitted within the
meaning of section 13353.2, and the Department of Motor Vehicles
is required to reinstate.173
In Claxton v. Zolin,174 the Fifth District Court of Appeal was
faced with a factual situation very similar to that faced by the Third
District in Helmandollar.75 In Claxton, two drivers entered into a
plea bargained acquittal where the prosecutor agreed to stipulate to
certain facts.176 The stipulation stated that it was reasonable that the
driver's blood-alcohol level at the time of the stop was below 0.08
percent, and that the court will find the driver not guilty of California
to accept a guilty plea or plea of nolo contendre as a substitute for an original charge of Vehicle
Code § 23152).
171. Helmandollar, 7 Cal. App. 4th at 54, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156.
172. See id at 56, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157. The Department of Motor Vehicles apparently
attempted to argue that the use of the word "charges" in § 13353.2 meant that before reinstatement
was required, the driver must be acquitted of"all charges" relating to the offense. Id. at 56-57,9 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 157-58.
173. Id at 57, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157-58.
174. 8 Cal. App. 4th 553, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 319 (1992).
175. Claxton, 8 Cal. App. 4th at 556-58, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 320-21. Claxton involved a number
of individuals who had been arrested and charged with driving under the influence of alcohol. Id. at
556-57, 10 Cal. Rplr. 2d at 320. However, the decision specifically deals with two drivers who
entered into a plea bargain with the prosecutor to stipulate to the facts underlying the charge of
driving with a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more in exchange for a guilty plea to California
Vehicle Code § 23152, subdivision (a). Id. at 557, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 321. The judgment on the
remaining drivers was appealed only as to the award of attorney's fees, which will not be addressed
in this article. See id. at 558, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 322.
176. Id. at 557 n.3, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 321 n.3.
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Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (b), in exchange for a guilty
plea to California Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (a).
177
The Department of Motor Vehicles argued that the language of
California Vehicle Code section 13353.2, subdivision (a)178 should
be read in such a way as to preclude reinstatement from acquittals
that did not involve actual litigation and determination of the
essential facts. 179 The drivers' argued that the language contained
within California Vehicle Code section 13353.2, subdivision (e),
requires reinstatement of a person's driving privilege when the
Department of Motor Vehicles receives an abstract of judgment
showing that the driver has been acquitted of the charges of
California Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (b).' 0 The
court looked to its prior decision in Agresti,'8' and determined that
the not guilty rulings in this case constituted a determination on the
merits, and therefore an acquittal:
The not-guilty ruling by the judge in [the drivers'] cases constituted a
resolution in [the drivers'] favor of the factual elements of the section
23152(b) charge. Regardless whether the judge's ruling was based on
adversarial litigation or a factual stipulation of the parties, the ruling
constituted a disposition of the criminal charge on the merits. Thus, [the
driverswere] "acquittedofcriminal chargesrelatingto adeterminationof
facts under subdivision (a).-112
177. Id. The record revealed a written stipulation including the facts as stated in the text. Id.
The trial court reluctantly agreed, and acquitted the two drivers. Id. The two drivers then attempted
to have their licenses reinstated by the Department of Motor Vehicles. Id. at 558, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 321. The Department of Motor Vehicles refused, and the drivers filed a writ of mandate in the
superior court. Id, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 321-22. The superior court issued the writ, and the Department
of Motor Vehicles appealed. Id., 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 322.
178. The relevant language of § 13353.2(e) is: "If a person is acquitted of criminal charges
relating to a determination offacts under subdivision (a), the department shall immediately reinstate
the person's privilege to operate a motor vehicle if the department has suspended it administratively
pursuant to subdivision (a)." CAL VEil. CODE § 13353.2(e) (West Supp. 1992) (emphasis added).
179. Claxton, 8 Cal. App. 4th at 560, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 323.
180. Id.
181. See supra notes 159-167 and accompanying text (discussing the Agresti decision).
182. Claxton, 8 Cal. App. 4th at 562, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 324. The court went on to explain
why the Department of Motor Vehicles was incorrect in its assertion:
Nothing in the language of the statute requires the narrow reading urged by the
Department. The "determination of facts" language does not refer to or qualify the
.acquittal of" language. Rather, that phrase qualifies the criminal charges language. It
limits licensure reinstatement to those cases where the driver is acquitted of crimes
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Therefore, when a driver is acquitted of California Vehicle Code
section 23152, subdivision (b), whether as a result of litigation or as
a result of a plea bargain, the Department of Motor Vehicles must
reinstate the driver's privilege to operate a motor vehicle.183
I. APPEALING ADVERSE DECISIONS BY THE DMV:
THE ADmINISTRATiVE WRrT PROCEDURE
Administrative mandamus is the proper remedy for judicial
review of an administrative action."' Generally, provisions of the
California Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 calling for a writ
of mandamus to inquire into the validity of a final administrative
order governs judicial review after a formal adjudicatory decision by
any administrative agency.185 More specifically, however,
California Vehicle Code section 13559 provides for judicial review
of an order suspending or revoking the driving privilege on the basis
of chemical test refusal or driving with an excessive blood alcohol
content. 186
relating to the factual determinations which authorized the Department to suspend the
driver's license under § 13353.2(a).
Id.
183. Id, at 562-63, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 325.
184. Grant v. Board of Medical Examiners, 232 Cal. App. 2d 820, 826,43 Cal. Rptr. 270,274
(1965). A writ of mandamus will lie when: (1) There is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (2)
the respondent has a duty to perform; and (3) the petitioner has a clear and beneficial right to
perform. Payne v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 908, 925, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405, 417 (1976). This must
be specifically plead in the petition for mandamus. Id.
185. Los Angeles County v. Tax Appeals Bd., 267 Cal. App. 2d 830, 833,73 Cal. Rptr. 469,
471 (1968).
186. CAL Vai. CODE § 13559(a) (West Supp. 1992). California Vehicle Code § 13559
provides for a petition for review within thirty days of an adverse decision suspending or revoking
a person's driving privilege after a hearing pursuant to California Vehicle Code § 13558. Id. Because
California Vehicle Code § 13559 is more specific than California Code of Civil Procedure 1094.5,
the former controls unless it is silent on the procedure. Coombs v. Pierce, 1 Cal. App. 4th 568, 575,
2 CaL Rptr. 2d 249, 252 (1991); see id Therefore, if a driver files for a writ of mandate pursuant to
Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.5, and the petition is filed after an adverse decision by the
Department of Motor Vehicles without an administrative hearing pursuant to California Vehicle Code
§ 13558, the procedures will be controlled by those set forth in the Code of Civil Procedure §
1094.5; see also CAL. VEi. CODE § 13558(a) (West Supp. 1992) (providing for an administrative
hearing on a driver's license suspension or revocation pursuant to California Vehicle Code § § 13353,
13353.2, 23157, or 23158.5); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1094.6(b),(d) (West Supp. 1992) (providing
that in a mandate proceeding to review decision of local agency other than school district, review
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Under section 13559, the petition for review must be filed within
thirty days from the order of suspension."8 7 According to section
13559, filing the petition for review shall not stay the order of
suspension or revocation. 8 However, because a review would be
meaningless without a stay,1 9 most courts grant stays pending final
determination in the superior court.19°
Under both California Vehicle Code section 13559 and Code of
Civil Procedure section 1094.5, the reviewing court may not consider
any evidence outside the administrative hearing record. 191 The
reviewing court may rescind the Department of Motor Vehicles'
order of suspension or revocation if it finds the Department: (1)
Misinterpreted the applicable law; (2) conducted the proceeding in an
must be within ninety days, with a possible extension if request before record filed); CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 11523 (West 1992) (allowing a mandate proceeding to review decision of administrative
agency subject to provisions of California Administrative Procedure Act and providing that a petition
must be filed within thirty days); Cummings v. City of Vernon, 214 Cal. App. 3d 919,920-24,263
Cal. Rptr. 97, 97-100 (1989) (stating that ninety day period in Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.6,
subdivision (b), runs from date that notice is required under Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.6,
subdivision (0, is mailed).
187. CAL. VEH. CODE § 13559(a) (West Supp. 1992).
188. Id.; but see Deepwell Homeowners Protective Ass'n v. City Council of Palm Springs, 239
Cal. App. 2d 63, 65, 48 Cal. Rptr. 321, 323 (1965) (holding that the inherent power of a reviewing
court to grant a stay applied where the effect of the judgment is such that a stay is necessary or
proper to complete the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction and where denial of a stay will result in
depriving the petitioner of the fruits of the review should he be successful); see also CAL. CIV. PRoc.
CODE § 1094.5(g) (West Supp. 1992) (granting a court the power to stay the operation of the
administrative order pending judgment of the court).
189. The time necessary to review the administrative order or decision could easily last long
enough to consume a significant portion of the suspension or revocation, so that if a petitioner
prevails, she will have nevertheless suffered a large portion of the evils of the suspension order which
she rightfully sought to overturn. See generally CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1094.5(g) (West Supp.
1992) (courts may stay administrative orders or decisions pending judgment of the court).
190. See, e.g., Robertson v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 7 Cal. App. 4th 938, 944,9 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 319, 322 (1992) (stating that the superior court granted a stay pending the hearing on the
writ of mandate).
191. CAT Vma. CoDE § 13559(a) (West Supp. 1992); CAL. Civ. PRoc. CoDE § 1094.5(h)
(West Supp. 1992); see Coombs v. Pierce, 1 Cal. App. 4th 568, 574,2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 249, 252 (1991)
(holding that the standard of review in California Vehicle Code § 13559 is consistent with the
standard of review stated in California Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.5, subdivision (b)).
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arbitrary and capricious manner; or (3) made factual findings which
were not supported by the evidence in the record.1 92
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
Historically, one of the most successful methods of challenging
new statutes has been the Equal Protection Clause of the federal and
state constitutions.193 The Equal Protection Clause requires that
persons under like circumstances be given equal protection in
personal and civil rights. 94 However, the clause does not create
any new rights; it simply requires that persons similarly situated
receive equal treatment. ' 95 Because the admin per se statutes appear
to treat similarly situated drivers differently, a few cases have
challenged the validity of these laws based on the apparent violation
of the state and federal equal protection clause.
In Peretto v. Department of Motor Vehicles,19 6 the Department
of Motor Vehicles suspended Peretto's driver's license after an
administrative per se hearing pursuant to Vehicle Code section
13353.2.'9 Peretto challenged the new administrative per se law as
unconstitutional claiming that it violated the Due Process clause and
192. CAL VEH. CODE § 13559(a) (West Supp. 1992); CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 1094.5(b)
(West Supp. 1992). A decision of the Department of Motor Vehicles to suspend or revoke a person's
driving privileges will be reviewed under the independent judgment standard. Berlinghieri v.
Department of Motor Vehicles, 33 Cal. 3d 392, 394, 657 P.2d 383, 384, 188 Cal. Rptr. 891, 892
(1983). Under the independent judgment standard, a trial court finds abuse of discretion if it
determines that the findings of the administrative agency were not supported by the weight of the
evidence. CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 1094.5(c) (West Supp. 1992). However, appellate review of the
trial court's decision is governed by the substantial evidence test. See Hosford v. Board of Admin.,
77 Cal. App. 3d 854, 859, 143 Cal. Rptr. 760, 763 (1978) (holding that appellate review of a trial
court's independent judgment limited to whether there was substantial evidence to support the
decision).
193. See generally Randall Fox, Equal Protection Analysis: Laurence Tribe, The Middle, and
the Pole of the Court, 14 U.S.F. L REv. 525 (1980).
194. U.S. CONST. amend. X1V, §§ 1-2; CAL. CONST. art I, § 7. See generally William Rich,
Equal Protection for the Poor: Fair Distribution to Meet Brutal Needs, 24 SAN DIEmo L REV. 1117
(1987); Gary J. Simson, A Methodfor Analyzing Discriminatory Effects Under the Equal Protection
Clause, 29 STAN. L REV. 663 (1977).
195. See generally Boling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942); In re Kotta, 187 Cal. 27, 200 P. 957 (1921); In re Finley, I Cal. App. 198, 81 P. 1041
(1905).
196. 235 Cal. App. 3d 449, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 392 (1991).
197. Peretto, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 452, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 392, 393 (1991).
500
1993 / Admin Per Se For The Practitioner
the Equal Protection clause of both the state and federal constitutions
and the state constitution's prohibition against special legislation.1 98
The Court of Appeal held that the statutory scheme did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause.1" Equal Protection analysis
requires a determination of whether the challenged law involves a
fundamental right or a suspect classification scheme."0 Because the
statutory scheme involved in administratively suspending a driver's
privilege to operate a motor vehicle does not involve a fundamental
right or a suspect classification,2"' the state must only show that its
scheme is "rationally related to a proper legislative goal."2 2
The court determined that the Legislature had a legitimate interest
in a scheme which reduces the number of dangerous drivers who
operate a motor vehicle with an excessive amount of alcohol in their
blood.0 3 The court also found the Legislature's differentiation of
commercial drivers from non-commercial drivers could be rationally
related to that interest.2 4 Therefore, the challenged statutory
scheme does not violate the equal protection clauses of the state or
198. Id. at 454, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 395. After an administrative hearing before the Department of
Motor Vehicles, Peretto filed for a temporary restraining order and injunctive relief in the superior
court. Id., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 394-95. The superior court rejected Peretto's due process claim but
found that Vehicle Code § 13353.6 violates the equal protection clauses of the federal and state
Constitutions. Id., I Cal. Rptr. 2d 395. The Department of Motor Vehicles then appealed to the First
District Court of Appeal. See iU. at 452, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 393 (directing the trial court on remand
to deny "respondent's" [Peretto's] petition).
199. Id. at 459, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 398. The court of appeal also agreed with the trial court that
the statutory scheme did not violate Due Process. Id. at 459-62, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 398-400.
200. Id. at 455, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 395; see D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners, 11 Cal.
3d 1, 16-17, 520 P.2d 10, 22, 112 Cal. Rptr. 786, 798 (1974) (discussing the proper standards in
equal protection analysis). The court limited its analysis to equal protection principles because the
parties agreed that rational basis test for equal protection also applied to the claim that the challenged
statutory scheme violates the state Constitution's prohibition against special legislation. Peretto, 235
Cal. App. 3d at 456 n.7, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 396 n.7; see Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 596 n.ll,
487 P.2d 1241, 1249 n.11, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 609 n.ll (1971) (holding that the "no special
privileges" clause of the California Constitution is substantially the equivalent of the Equal Protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution).
201. Peretto conceded to the court of appeal that challenged statutory scheme did not involved
a suspect classification or a fundamental right for equal protection analysis. Peretto, 235 Cal. App.
3d at 455, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 395.
202. Id. at 455-56, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 396.
203. See id. at 458-59, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 397-98 (arguing that it is a legitimate interest of the
Legislature to regulate highway safety and the licensing of drivers on the state's highways).
204. Id.
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federal Constitutions or the state constitution's prohibition against
special legislation. 5
V. CONCLUSION
New statutory schemes always include unforeseen problems.
Addressing these problems requires a person who has been adversely
affected by the statutory scheme. The process of addressing only the
issue properly before a court requires many years of litigation before
most of the "bugs" have been worked out. Practitioners involved in
this litigation must commonly advocate public policy when faced
with interpreting a new statutory scheme which has not been
previously clarified by an appellate court. In order to effectively
argue the policy underlying the administrative per se statutory
scheme, practitioners must have a thorough understanding of the
background and history of the relevant statutes.
Effective representation of a client's interest in the administrative
proceeding requires a working knowledge of the administrative
agency's procedures and how they differ from state court criminal
procedures. Practitioners must also be able to recognize when the
administrative agency's decision is in conflict with existing case law
interpretations of the statute in question, and when, lacking appellate
guidance, the agency's decision would not withstand judicial
scrutiny.
The current case law interpretation of the admin per se statutes is
not only the proper way to interpret these statutes, it is the only fair
method of suspending a person's privilege to operate a motor vehicle
for driving with an excessive blood-alcohol concentration.
Admittedly, there is a need to remove dangerous drivers from our
highways in order to prevent the carnage of innocent drivers. To date,
the admin per se procedure is the most effective tool in this endeavor.
However, we must balance the need to remove dangerous drivers
from our highways with each individual's constitutional right not to
205. Id. at 459, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 398. For a similar case challenging California Vehicle Code
§ 13353.3, subdivision (b)(1), on the grounds that it violated both the due process and equal
protection clauses of the federal and state Constitutions, which reached the same conclusion as the
court in Peretto, see, Murphy v. Pierce, 1 Cal. App. 4th 690, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 18 (1991) (a Sixth
District Court of Appeal decision filed one month after Peretto).
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have his or her privilege to operate a motor vehicle suspended
without due process of law. Adherence to the foundational belief that
every person is entitled to a fundamentally fair hearing procedure
where the proponent must bear the burden of proof that a driver
actually committed the alleged offense is essential to maintain public
confidence in the existing judicial system. As practitioners, it is
imperative that we remain alert to legislative changes that may
violate one of these fundamental tenants.
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